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Production,  processing  and transportation  of agricultural  products  involve  numerous
issues of food safety and  animal and plant health.  These issues arise  within countries and,
particularly,  when raw and processed agricultural products cross international borders.  There
are public good dimensions to provision of a safe food supply and to protection of domestic
animal herds and plant stocks from pests and diseases.  But regulations that help nations to
provide these public goods can also be used to shield domestic producers from international
competition.
Despite widespread  field-based  evidence of misuse  of technical  barriers  to agricultural
trade, only a few empirical  studies (e.g., Hillman 1978,  1991; Kramer  1989) have attempted
to evaluate regulatory  decision making about such barriers in depth.  This lack of analysis is
surprising given the rich literature that has evolved on the economic theory of regulation and
the numerous empirical studies the theoretical literature has spawned  addressing a wide range
of regulatory agencies  and decisions.
This paper presents a case study of the regulatory  process in the longstanding  dispute
between Mexico and the United States  [US]  over a US quarantine,  originally established  in
1914, which has prohibited  importation of Mexican avocados.  Since 1972,  there have been
three  extensive  reevaluations  of pest  risks  and  risk-mitigation  procedures  to  determine
whether the quarantine could be amended without risk of pest infestations  to domestic groves.
Two set  of survey results during the  1970s  seemed to convince  technical  analysts  in the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service [APHIS] of the US Department of Agriculture
[USDA]  that protocols could be developed for importation of avocados into the northeastern
section of the US with negligible risk of pest infestation.  The domestic US industry, which
has high sunk costs in existing groves and benefits under the quarantine from a favorable price
differential for domestically-grown avocados,  opposed any changes in the US phytosanitary
import regulations.  It disagreed  with  the conclusions  drawn  from pest  survey results by
USDA  scientists  about  the  risk posed  by  avocados  exported  from  two  Mexican  states,
Michoacan  and  Sinaloa.  The  domestic  industry's  views,  which  were  actively  registered
throughout the investigations,  prevailed  on the final decisions and  no import permits were
issued in either case.
*The  research was supported by USDA\ERS\CAD  Cooperative Agreement No. 43-3AEL-4-
80063.  We would like to thank Irim Siddiqui for research assistance.  Views expressed  are
those of the authors.  This paper was completed  in September  1995,  after publication  by
USDA of the avocado proposed rule in July  1995, as described in the text, but prior to the
public  hearings  and  comment  period  on  the  rule.  For  discussion  of the  hearings  and
subsequent  events, see Orden and Romano (1996).
117The initiation of negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement  [NAFTA]
provided the impetus for the third reevaluation of the avocado  quarantine starting in  1990.
A long investigation has followed during the past five years.  During this period, Mexico  has
drafted  a number of proposals for a protocol under which it asserts that imports would not
pose  a  pest  risk  to  US  producers.  After  substantial  review  and  modification  of these
proposals, the USDA held hearings in November  1994 to solicit  public comment on Mexico's
request  to  export  avocados  to  the  northeastern  US,  before  proceeding  with  official
rulemaking procedures to modify the longstanding  quarantine.
At the public hearings,  the domestic industry continued to raise strong objections to the
protocol under  which Mexico  had  proposed  allowing  avocado  imports.  In particular,  it
argued that the Mexican growing areas had not been proven to be free of pests that could be
transmitted  to  the  US  and  that  the  set  of procedures  under which  pest-risk  was  to be
mitigated  did  not provide adequate protection  from possible pest  infestation to domestic
avocado groves.
Despite the industry objections,  in July  1995 a proposed rule was published by APHIS.
The proposed rule recommended  amending the existing quarantine  on Mexican avocados to
allow permits for imports into the northeastern part of the country from the Mexican  state of
Michoacan during the months of November to February when weather  conditions in Mexico
and the US minimize the risk of pest infestations.  The proposed rule also established stringent
criteria  to  be  met  for  monitoring  insect  populations,  harvesting,  packing  and  shipping
practices,  and inspections to eliminate any pest risks.
The proposed  rule published  by APHIS  marks an  important  step  in the  longstanding
dispute  between  Mexico  and the US  over the pest  risks  associated  with  importation  of
Mexican avocados.  For the first time, USDA is on the public record in support of a protocol
under which  imports  can  be  allowed  without  creating  a phytosanitary  risk for  domestic
producers.  The proposed rule will be reviewed in five public hearings and subject to public
comment through October  16,  1995.  If the proposed  rule stands up to the extensive scrutiny
it will receive at these public hearings,  and if a subsequent final rule is published that amends
the existing quarantine, then the avocado dispute will provide an important example of a case
in  which  international  negotiations  to liberalize  trade  prompted  changes that  eased  trade
restrictions in the arcane area of technical barriers to agricultural products.
Political Economy  Theory  of Regulation
A large part of the literature  on the political economy of regulation focuses on the concept
of regulatory processes being captured by concentrated  interest groups, with the result that
their purposes are served by the regulatory decisions.  Modem origins of this line of reasoning
are found in Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker.  Central to the notion of "capture"  in this context
is  a failure of the political process  in that special interests with high  stakes in a particular
decision overcome organizational and free-rider difficulties more successfully than others--as
per  Olsen--thus achieve benefits from regulations  (often income transfers)  at a net cost to
society more generally.
118It is useful to conceptualize the regulatory process as a multiple principle-agent  problem,
as shown in Figure  1. The executive, congressional  and judicial branches of government  hold
broad authority, which is delegated to agency  administrative hierarchies  subject to imperfect
influence  through appointments,  budgets, oversight  hearings, judicial  rulings, and the like.
Preparing  the cases for any specific regulatory decision then rests further in the agencies  in
the  hands  of scientific  and  technical  staff  Again,  only  imperfect  control  of the  staff is









Figure 1.  Schematic  representation of the regulatory process.
Objective technical  and economic  conditions bear  on the regulatory decision  structure
through the filter of various interest groups.  These interest groups may capture the regulatory
process  at different  levels:  through their broadest  influence  on the executive,  congress  or
judiciary,  through close relationships with the agency  administrative  hierarchies  in areas  of
specific concerns, or through their direct (and often frequent  and intense)  participation in the
process  at the  technical  level.  The tools  by  which the  interest  groups may influence  or
capture  the regulatory  process  (political  contributions,  the  "revolving  door"  of agency-
industry employment, confirmation of professional  stature, and others) vary with the level at
which they seek opportunity.
An important conceptual  issue addresses the existence of "slack"  between principals (the
executive/congress/judiciary  and the agency  hierarchies  in Figure  1) and  their agents (the
agency hierarchies  and their staff, respectively).  The slack arises because the mechanisms  of
119control are imperfect and the agents have more or less freedom depending on the degree to
which control is exerted.
Some authors (e.g.,  Levine  and Forrence  1990) argue that capture  can only occur when
there is slack and agents are subject to interest group pressure.  Such an argument precludes
capture of the higher-level  principals--an  assumption that is suspect  in light of much of the
rest of the literature  (e.g., McCubbins,  Noll, and Weingast 1989).  Others analysts  argue for
a positive  correlation between  slack and  capture (the greater the slack,  the more  likely  is
capture),  citing, for example, differences  in behavior between regulatory agencies subject to
executive branch authority and the independent  regulatory bodies.  Again, this presumes that
higher-level  principals are less subject to capture by specific interests, in part because of the
more diverse competing interests they seek to build into supportive coalitions.
More broadly,  the dominance  of capture theory in the literature on regulatory  decision
making  has other critics.  Specifically,  the critics  point to recent deregulation  of powerful
oligopolistic  industries  in telecommunications  and  transportation,  and  to  the widespread
emergence of environmental  regulations opposed by powerful industries  (e.g.,  Farber  1992;
McNollgast  1990).  These  cases are cited  as suggestive of the inadequacy  of the capture-
theory construct.'
A second  line of criticism of capture theory rests with what is often termed the "new
institutionalism."  In a recent paper, Kalt asserts that the new institutional view does not deny
the primacy of the capture-theory determinants  of political-economy  outcomes.  But the new
institutionalists allow some meaningful role for contextual variables that reach beyond interest
group stakes and power.  These include ideology (Kalt and Zupan  1984), the separation of
powers and conflicting jurisdictions of multiple principals  (Moe 1985),  and numerous aspects
of procedures,  precedent,  legal context and so on (e.g., Kalt 1994;  Mashaw  1990).
Acknowledging  these challenges  to  strong capture  theory,  it  is useful  to explore  the
conditions under which capture would be likely to be observed in regulatory decisions,  and
when it would be less likely.  Such a list begins with the fundamentals  of capture theory itself:
all else equal,  capture would be more likely when there are substantial economic  stakes, large
differentials in the per-constituent  stakes among interests, and  differences in the determinants
(like group size and uniformity) of costs and ability to  organize to assert political pressure.
2
XWilson  presents a broad typology  of regulatory cases based on the politics  of the distribution
of costs and benefits.  Wilson's four categories of politics  are 1] majoritian (broadly dispersed
costs and benefits),  2] interest group (narrow costs  and benefits),  3]  client (narrow benefits,
dispersed costs),  and 4] entrepreneurial (broad benefits,  narrow costs).  Critics argue that the
interest group and client cases  are best explained  by capture theory.
2Kalt provides an interesting case  study.  Among  various decisions  by the International Trade
Commission during the course of the recent US-Canada lumber trade dispute, a number of
contextual factors mattered to the administrative outcomes when  the stakes were low,  but
decisions  always favored the domestic US  interests when the stakes were high.
120Beyond  these  fundamentals  from  capture  theory,  various  institutional  or  procedural
factors  that influence the  probability of capture  determining  regulatory  outcomes  can  be
identified  from the existing literature.  Environmental regulations  suggest that one such factor
is broad public interest in a specific issue that can be brought to the forefront of public debate.
Levine  and Forrence note that in this setting there are incentives  for politicians to ferret out
regulatory  decisions that run counter to public opinion  and reduce  agency  slack to induce
regulations more consistent with public views.  Competition among politicians enhances  this
incentive.
Critics of capture theory also note that interest groups  can arise that purport to represent
the general interest.  Their organizational costs may be higher than those of more narrowly-
focused  interests  but  they  are  not  infinite.  In the  marginal  calculus  of optimal  political
response to interest group pressure, outcomes of regulatory processes should not shut out all
but a single group from the regulatory  outcome.  In this context, Levine and Forrence argue
that attention from the media or academics (both of which have incentives to focus on special-
interest policy of which the public would disapprove)  are factors that may shift the balance
of an outcome away from strong capture theory.
Some  additional  factors  that would favor  capture  of regulatory decisions  can also  be
identified.  Highly technical questions on issues with little direct public impact are likely to
favor narrow interests.  Agencies focused on single industries may be  more susceptible  to
capture  (Reagan  1987).  Discrete  (all  or nothing)  choices  also  favor  capture  by  narrow
interests with high stakes.  Such discrete choices  preclude  the continuum of outcomes that
might emerge from optimizing marginal  calculus.
Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Phytosanitary Regulations
The USDA has the responsibility and the authority to protect domestic agriculture from
the  introduction  and  establishment  of foreign  plant  pests  under  the  terms  of the Plant
Quarantine Act of 1912 (7 USC  151  et seq.)  and related acts.  The enforcement of these acts
has  been delegated  to APHIS,  and is  carried  out  by the Plant Protection  and Quarantine
Program  [PPQ].3  Plant quarantines  are administered by PPQ to prohibit or restrict the entry
of foreign  plants  and  plant  products  that  are  known to be  hosts to  pests  of quarantine
significance.4
3Veterinary Services  is the other principal program in APHIS.  There are eight other programs
in  APHIS,  including  the  International  Services  [IS]  Program, which  is  responsible  for
international animal and plant health matters, including  the facilitation of safe  global  trade
(APHIS  1992).
4A "quarantine  pest" or "pest of quarantine  significance"  is defined by the North American
Plant  Protection  Organization  as  "a  pest  of potential  economic  importance  to the  area
endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being
officially controlled" (p. 22).  An area is "an officially defined country, part of a country, or
all or parts of several countries."
121PPQ  administers  the  Fruit  and  Vegetables  Quarantine,  7  CFR 319.56  [Q56],  which
establishes the terms under which fruits and vegetables can gain entry into the US.  "Q56 is
a restrictive quarantine,  which means that rules are made for the entry of specific products  on
a  region-by-region  basis.  When APHIS  receives a request  from a foreign government  or
domestic  importer  to  allow  entry  of a  product,  PPQ  first  assesses  the  pest  risk,  then
recommends rules to permit entry of the product with minimal  risk to US agriculture.  In
principle, the recommendations  are guided by a commitment to quarantine rules that utilize
the "least drastic action."  The goal is to afford maximum protection against plant pests while
imposing the fewest possible barriers to normal commerce  and trade.
The  regulations  in  Q56  state that  APHIS  may  grant  an  import  permit  if the  fruit  or
vegetable:
1)  is not attacked in the country of origin by injurious insects;
2)  has been treated or is to be treated for all injurious insects that attack it in the
country of origin;
3)  is imported  from a definite area or district in the country of origin that is free
from all injurious insects; or
4)  is imported from a definite area or district that is free from certain injurious
insects and that all other injurious insects have been eliminated  by treatment or
any other approved procedures.'
The "approved procedures" noted in (4) provide APHIS with the authority to allow entry
of some products into the US using a "systems approach"  to mitigate the assessed risks.  A
systems approach utilizes a combination of risk mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood
of introducing injurious pests in the importing country.  Systems approaches  are considered
when  it is not possible to establish  a definite pest-free  area in  a foreign country and post-
harvest treatments to eradicate the pests cause irreparable damage to the commodity or leave
unacceptable  chemical residues.  The US is not the only country willing to rely on a systems
approach to mitigate plant pest risk.  The US exports citrus to Japan,  plums to Mexico  and
apples  and pears to  Taiwan under protocols  that  specify different  systems  approaches to
minimize  plant  pest  risk.  APHIS  also  uses  systems  approaches  to  facilitate  interstate
commerce.  For example, citrus fruit grown in areas of Texas that are seasonally infested with
the Mexican fruit fly can be shipped to markets throughout most of the continental US under
the terms of a systems approach protocol that mitigates pest risk.6
57  CFR  319.56-2(e).  National  Archives  and Records  Administration,  Code of Federal
Regulations,  1/94, p. 220.
6Statement by Chuck Havens, Trade Support Unit, APHIS.  Transcript of the Meeting in San
Diego, CA, 11/29/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, pp.  15  -16.
122Amending Q56 to allow entry of products from a specified region or country begins with
a request to allow imports from a domestic firm or a foreign government.  Requests can be
in the form of a simple letter,  but experienced  petitioners usually expedite their request by
submitting  a work plan to APHIS  describing the terms under which imports would occur.
A  proposed  work  plan  details  risk  mitigation  procedures  and  assigns  responsibility  for
carrying  out  the  procedures  to  institutions  in  each  country.  A thorough  work  plan  is
accompanied  by a  formal pest  risk assessment  and additional  research  to substantiate  the
foundations for the proposed pest mitigation procedures.
PPQ's technical staff bases its recommendation for changes in Q56 on its review of the
work  plan,  if provided,  and  on its own  independent  pest  risk assessment.  If insufficient
information is available to answer important questions about the potential risks, APHIS  will
reject  the  request until  either the  foreign  government  or  USDA's Agricultural  Research
Service  [ARS] can complete additional research which provides the required information.  If
PPQ largely concurs with the risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures  in a proposed
work  plan,  USDA  scientists  resolve  minor  differences  in  technical  meetings  with  their
counterparts in the foreign government.
Once  the technical  issues  are  resolved,  a proposed  regulation  (or rule)  is  drafted  for
review by senior policymakers 7 in APHIS and USDA.8  If it is approved, APHIS publishes
the proposed rule in the Federal Register, along with an announcement  of when and where
public hearings  will  be held  on  the matter.'  The public  is  also  invited  to  submit written
comments on the proposed rule to APHIS during a specified period, usually one month.
When the "comment period" is over,  APHIS'  technical  staff reviews and responds to the
written and  oral comments.  On rare occasions, the staff will decide to withdraw the initial
rule based  on the information  provided by interested  parties  during the  comment  period.
More typically the proposed rule is published as a final rule,  either as originally proposed or
with revisions.
7The phrase "senior policymaker"  or "senior  official"  signifies individuals who hold the title
of  Deputy Administrator, Administrator,  Assistant Secretary,  or Secretary or persons acting
in their capacity during absences or vacancies.
8Ifthe proposed change in the regulation is expected to have more than a $100  million impact
on the US economy, the proposed rule must also be reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget.
9Prior to 1987, APHIS usually issued or denied import permits upon completion of an internal
review (under the authority granted the agency by Title 7, 319.56-2(e) of the Code of Federal
Regulations), without notification, public comment,  or publication in the Federal Register.
Since  1987,  APHIS  has  followed  the  Administrative  Procedures  Act  guidelines  for
rulemaking  (as  described  herein) when  considering  changes to  sanitary  and phytosanitary
import regulations.
123The US-Mexico  Avocado  Dispute
A change in the phytosanitary rules to permit importation of avocados  from Mexico  into
the United  States would require amendment  of Q56.'0  Typically,  the rulemaking  process
takes two to three years for products covered by this regulation.  In the case  of Mexican
avocados,  changes  in the  rule have  been intermittently  studied,  reviewed,  and  debated by
USDA scientists and policymakers since 1972, making this case a very longstanding dispute.1
Industry and Market Characteristics
The avocado industry is a small component of the $8.3  billion fresh fruit industry in the
US, with typical annual  cash receipts of $200-$250 million.  There are approximately 7,000
domestic avocado producers.  About 6,000,  accounting  for 95 percent  of the US crop,  are
concentrated  near the  southern coast of California.  Another  500  are  located  in southern
Florida.  About 80 percent of avocado  growers have annual  sales of less than $25,000 year,
but there are also  a number of large avocado producers.  Two percent  of the producers  in
California had sales in excess of $500,000 in  1987 and harvested  38 percent  of the 70,000
acres planted in avocados in California in 1990  (USDA/ERS  1995).  Large firms dominate
the  marketing  of avocados.  Calavo,  an  agricultural  cooperative  with  more  than  2,000
members,  markets about half of the California crop (American Farm Bureau  1991).
Establishing an avocado orchard requires a substantial investment in land clearing, grading
of access roads, installation of drip irrigation systems, and propagation of young trees.  Once
the orchard is established, trees can start bearing in as few as two to three years.  The trees
reach full bearing potential after about seven years and can remain productive for as long as
40 years.  The California  Cooperative  Extension Service  estimated that in  1992,  the total
accumulated  cost of establishing  an orchard in the Southern Coast region of California was
$15,372 per acre over the initial six years (USDA/ERS  1995).  Such calculations  support the
assertion  by the  chairman  of the California  Avocado  Commission  [CAC]  that California
growers have over $1 billion invested  in the avocado industry.12
10 The 1932 revocation  of the original avocado  fruit order of February 27,  1914 allowed  the
avocado fruit to be covered by Quarantine 56.  Avocado growing stock (including the seed)
is now covered by Quarantine 37, which covers nursery stock, plants, roots, bulbs, seeds, and
other plant products.
"Antecedents  of the  avocado  case may  have prior origins but our review of the available
historical documentation indicates that Mexico first requested an import permit for avocados
from USDA/APHIS in 1972.  Tracing the history of the avocado quarantine  dispute back 23
years seems sufficient to assess the determinants of the regulatory decisions.
12Transcript of the Meeting in San Diego, CA, 11/29/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, p. 36.
124Over the past ten years, avocado-bearing  acreage has declined  slightly in California (10
percent)  and substantially  in Florida (50 percent). 1 3  Growers in California  and Florida face
similar economic challenges,  and a secular decline in acreage in both states began in the late
1980s.  Increasing urbanization  in southern California and Florida has caused land prices to
be prohibitive even for profitable growers who want to expand their operations.14  Producing
avocados  is  also  a  water-intensive  activity,  so  rising  costs  of irrigation  water  have
substantially lowered profits for some growers,  especially  in San Diego County.
Despite the declining acreage, total domestic US production of avocados has been around
170,000 metric tons per year during 1990-1994, up slightly from the 1985-1989  average.  The
US industry exports a small amount of avocados  each year, but foreign countries,  principally
Chile  and  The  Dominican  Republic,  typically  supply  about  ten percent  of the  avocados
marketed  in the US.15  Other foreign countries  occasionally  export small  shipments to the
US.16  Hawaii produces  a small amount of avocados, but phytosanitary  restrictions prohibit
distribution of Hawaiian avocados on the mainland because of presence there of the Medfly,
melon fly and Oriental fruit fly.' 7
Chile, like California, produces the small, black-skinned Hass variety  of avocado  and ships
its produce to the US during the California off-season.  The Dominican Republic  and Florida
supply consumers  on the east coast with the larger green-skinned  avocado varieties that are
preferred  by  immigrants  from  the  Caribbean  and  Central  America.  Consumers  pay  a
substantial price premium for Hass avocados, but Hass production is prevented in Florida and
elsewhere by high humidity levels (American Farm Bureau  1991).
13The  sharp  decline in Florida resulted  from the decisions  of many farmers not to replant
avocado trees after Hurricane Andrew destroyed their groves in  1992.
14High land prices imply high rental costs for those who don't own land and high opportunity
costs  for those who  do.  As  one  observer  noted,  ".  . . San  Diego  growers  are  in  two
businesses and the first is real estate" (Evangelou  et al.  1993). " 5Chile has no host-specific avocado pests, but the Mediterranean  fruit fly (Ceratitus  capitata)
is  an  indigenous  pest.  However,  APHIS  has  acknowledged  the  Medfly-free  status  of a
defined district in Chile and issued an import permit that allowed Chile to export avocados
for the first time in 1985.  The Dominican Republic has no pests of quarantine  significance
that infest avocados.
16APHIS  has recently approved imports of avocados  from New Zealand  (1991)  and Bermuda
(1992).  In these latter cases, the countries were determined  to be free of pests of quarantine
significance.
'7In 1989, the regulations were changed to allow shipments from Hawaii to every state after
ARS scientists concluded that Hawaii's Sharwil avocado were not hosts to these three flies
if growers and packers followed  specified harvesting and handling procedures.  Shipments
were suspended in early 1992 when an APHIS inspector found fruit fly larvae on unharvested,
unblemished  avocados.  Subsequent research by ARS  confirmed that avocados that met all
the regulatory requirements for interstate movement  could be infested by these three fruit
flies, so the 1989 decision was reversed in July,  1992.  In  1994, APHIS  approved shipments
of Hawaiian avocados to Alaska only.
125Although it has been prohibited from exporting to the US, Mexico  is the world's largest
producer of avocados.  Its annual production is 500,000 to 700,000  metric tons (American
Farm Bureau 1991).  Most of Mexico's avocados are produced  for its domestic market.  The
size,  appearance,  and  provenance  (from  areas  known  to  contain  pests  of quarantine
significance)  makes most of the Mexican  avocados unsuitable  for the international  market.
However, there are a number of growers and packers in Michoacan,  the  state in southwestern
Mexico that produces more than two-thirds of the country's avocados,  who have chosen to
incur the additional costs of sophisticated grove management,  packing,  and shipping practices
in order to gain access to markets in Europe,  Canada, and Japan.
The  growers  and  packers  who produce  for foreign  markets  participate  in  an export
registration  program administered  by the Direccion General  de Sanidad  Vegetal  [SV],  the
plant protection division of the Ministry of Agriculture,  Livestock, and Rural Development
[SAGDR].' 8  The  SV export program  requires  the participants  to comply  with stringent
inspection,  packing,  and shipping practices  to ensure that pests are not present  in the fresh
avocados  shipped abroad. 1 9  Some distributors that operate primarily in the United States,
such as Calavo, also supply foreign markets with Mexican avocados  through the SV program
in order to extend the season during which they are able to supply their customers.
Export-producers  in Mexico expanded their groves throughout the 1980s, principally with
the Hass variety of avocado (American Farm Bureau  1991).  These trees have reached or are
approaching  their  full  bearing  potential,  heightening  interest  of the  industry  in  finding
additional  export  markets  (Paz-Vega  1987).  Mexico  is  now  the  third  largest  avocado
exporter,  behind Spain and Israel (FAO).
The US Quarantine
The US banned imports of  Mexican avocados in 1914.  At that time, plant health officials
identified  avocado  seed  weevils  in Mexican  orchards  as pests  of quarantine  significance.
Although these pests cause little or no damage to trees or foliage, they oviposit (lay eggs) on
the fruit.  The larvae subsequently tunnel into the fruit,  scarring the peel, contaminating the
flesh, and destroying the seed.
When the quarantine was enacted, there were no known  controls (chemical  or natural
predator)  for  the  seed weevils.  The  natural  migration  of these insects  to  the  US  was
prevented by the inhospitable terrain of northern Mexico.
1 8Formerly the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources  [SARH].
19SV  regulations  stipulate,  for example,  that detection of any  pests in a  shipment of fruit
during  inspection at a packing house requires rejection of the entire  shipment for export.
Discovery of pests in an orchard requires that the grower's permit to  export avocados be
withdrawn (Federal Register 12/19/92,  p. 47573).
126Scientists and policymakers in SV maintain that modern pesticides and  cultural practices
have eliminated  the rationale for the US  prohibition on the  entry of Mexican  avocados.20
Mexican producers view the current quarantine  as simply a non-tariff barrier that prevents
them from competing with domestic  producers for the lucrative  US market. 21
Whatever the merits of the quarantine on phytosanitary terms, there are  strong economic
incentives for domestic producers to oppose imports of avocados from Mexico.  One study
concluded,  for  example,  that  Mexico  is  competitive  in  international  avocado  markets
principally because of its low land costs.  The authors pointed  out that orchard development
costs in Michoacan are estimated to be only 25 percent of the costs in California (American
Farm  Bureau  1991).  Moreover,  according  to  a spokesman  for the  Union  of Avocado
Growers of Michoacan,  production  costs for bearing  trees  were  $600  - $900 per acre  in
Mexico  in 1990,  compared to the per acre cost of $5,200 to $5,700  in California.22
To further  evaluate the relative  competitiveness  of California avocado  producers,  we
compared the wholesale prices of California Hass avocados on the east and west coasts of the
US to the wholesale prices of export-quality Michoacan Hass avocados in Montreal.  Prices
were  collected  at four different  points throughout the marketing year to  capture  seasonal
variations in prices for the California and Michoacan crops.  The peak marketing season for
California growers is between March and July, while Michoacan's  peak export season occurs
from October through February.  However, mature avocados can remain on the tree for up
to eight months, so growers in both regions market them year-round.
The wholesale  prices of export-quality  Mexican  avocados are  substantially  lower than
those for Californian avocados throughout the marketing year,  as shown in Table  1.23  These
market-price  differentials  provide  a  strong economic  incentive  for domestic  producers  to
protect the return on their investments  in existing  groves by opposing modification  of the
import quarantine.
20Over the past  several  decades, the USDA has allowed  entry of mandado avocados,  de-
seeded  avocados that  are  carried  across the  border by  individuals.  The USDA has  also
allowed transit of sealed containers of Mexican avocados  on specified routes in the US to
foreign markets (7 CFR 352.29, Administrative Instructions:  Avocados from Mexico).
21"Mexican Envoy  Says Food Disputes to Be Part of Trade Talks," Journal  of Commerce,
5/14/91,  p.  10A.
22"Mexican Avocados:  Threat or Opportunity?"  California  Grower, Vol.  15, No. 1, 1/90,
p.13.
2Note that Mexican avocado prices would still be lower than US prices after adding the US
base tariff of 5.99 cents per pound to the price of Mexican avocados.  The tariff is gradually
reduced to zero over a 15-year period beginning in 1994 under the terms of the NAFTA.
127Table 1.  Wholesale  prices  of  Hass  avocados  throughout the  marketing year,  US
dollars per pound1
Week of  Week  of  Week of  Week of
Source/Destination  1/5/94  4/22/94  7/15/94  10/21/94
Mexico/Montreal  .41  .53  .76  --
California/New York City  1.31  --  --  1.73
California/Los Angeles  --  1.19  1.44  1.73
Source:  USDA/AMS
'Lowest  quoted price.
The price differential  between US avocados  and avocados  sold in Mexico's domestic
markets is even greater than the differential between wholesale prices for US  and export-
quality Mexican fruit.  This has resulted in smuggling of commercial  shipments of avocados
across the US-Mexican border.  Between 1985 and April  1994, APHIS's PPQ border patrols
in El Paso confiscated  165 tons of avocados.  Over 300 weevils,  1 fruit fly, and more than 280
other insects were detected in the illegal shipments  confiscated  on the Mexican-US  border
between  1991  and  1993.24  The confiscated  avocados are usually roughly packed  in slatted
wooden crates.  This packing  suggests that the confiscated  shipments are diverted from the
domestic Mexican market since growers and packers that supply foreign markets through the
SV export program carefully  pack individual avocados in labeled,  sealed cartons.25
The California industry also complains about illegal transshipment of Mexican avocados
through Canada.  The president of the California Farm Bureau Federation  has pointed out that
illegal transshipments through Vancouver, British Columbia have been intercepted26 and the
president of the California  Avocado  Commission  [CAC]  has  noted that  USDA intensive
border  searches  in  1993  resulted  in  42  incidents  involving  the  confiscation  of Mexican
avocados  at the Blain,  Washington  border  station.27  Industry  representatives  who  have
pointed out the problem of smuggling across the US'  northern border have not complained
about insects being detected in the avocados that were intercepted--perhaps  because these are
the export-quality avocados that Mexico had legally shipped to Canada.
24Memo,  Ernesto  L.  Montoya,  Public Awareness  Officer,  APHIS/  PPQ, El  Paso,  Texas,
4/12/94.
25Interview, APHIS/PPQ,  Import Permit Unit, 3/2/95.
26Transcript of the Meeting  in San Diego,  CA, 11/29/94  to discuss the Advance  Notice  of
Proposed Rulemaking,  p.  34.
27Transcript of the Meeting  in San Diego,  CA,  11/29/94 to discuss the Advance  Notice  of
Proposed Rulemaking, p. 41.
128Two Reevaluations of the Quarantine,  1972-1979
Michoacan
The  Mexican  government  requested  a  permit  to  export  avocados  from  the  state  of
Michoacan to the US in the early  1970s.  According to the memorandum  on its decision,
APHIS noted that a literature review revealed that numerous pests of quarantine  significance
attacked avocados in Mexico,  including seed weevils and seed moths.  APHIS also pointed
out that these pests, along with Mexican fruit flies, were frequently intercepted  in contraband
shipments  from Mexico.  Given that  there were  no  approved  treatment  for these pests,
APHIS'  technical staff recommended that the request be denied. 28
One year  later,  after  reviewing  the results  of an APHIS  field  survey  in Michoacan's
commercial  groves,  the  agency  scientists  reversed  their  recommendation.  During  its
investigation, APHIS spent a total of 560 man-days looking for avocado pests in Michoacan
during May, June,  and September  1973.  The investigators  found only two fruit flies in four
growing districts of Michoacan  through the survey.
In November 1973,  the APHIS scientific staff recommended that entry of four varieties
of avocados  from these  districts  be permitted  for  distribution  in  states  north and  east  of
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Utah, and Virginia.  Limiting imports to the
northeast  was presumed  to provide  an extra  degree of risk insurance  to  domestic  groves
because  of the  geographic  distances  from  domestic  avocado  producing  areas.  The
recommended  protocol  also  stipulated  requirements  for  ports of entry,  notice  of arrival,
inspections,  and shipping requirements. 29
Senior policymakers  in APHIS appeared  to concur with the recommendations  of their
scientific  staff.  Five months  after the recommendation,  in  April  1974,  the  Office  of the
Administrator  drafted  a position  paper that proposed  an  export  protocol  for Michoacan
avocados. 30  However, another  15 months elapsed without any action to implement  such a
proposal.
In July  1975, the Acting Deputy Administrator of APHIS wrote to the Director of SV that
"..  there  was  intense  interest  in  and  opposition  to  the importation  of avocados  from
Michoacan." 31  He noted that APHIS had made  a commitment to the domestic  avocado
industry that the agency would  not change the  entry status of Mexican  avocados  without
publishing a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Public Meetings"  in the Federal Register.
28 Decision on Entry Status of Fruits and Vegetables Under Quarantine No. 56, signature of
M.J. Ramsey, APHIS/PPQ,  11/20/72.
29Decision on Entry Status of Fruits and Vegetables Under Quarantine No. 56, signature of
M.J. Ramsey, APHIS/PPQ,  11/15/73.
30Draft of Position Paper, Office of the Administrator, 4/8/74.
3 Letter  from  T.G. Darling,  Acting  Deputy  Administrator,  APHIS  to  Benjamin  Ortega
Cantero, Director,  SV, 7/7/75.
129He pointed out that "This is not a normal part of the permit issuance procedure but appears
to be necessary in view of...  the feeling among US avocado producers that revocation of
the quarantine and liberalization  of entry requirements  are planned,  sequential actions."
Over the next year,  again no  action was taken to change the entry status  of Mexican
avocados.  In July 1976, the Deputy Administrator of APHIS finally notified  SV that "..  we
must continue,  as in the past, to rule against the issuance of permits for the importation  of
avocado fruit from Mexico.  This reverses the recommendation  of our position paper..."32
The Deputy Administrator noted in his letter that a "cursory  survey" in February  1976 found
larvae  and adults of an avocado  seed weevil species at a site that had also been included in
the  1973  field surveys.  He indicated that APHIS had concluded that "The apparent  ease with
which seed weevils were recovered in Michoacan  (both as reported by Plant Protection and
Quarantine Programs and by commercial  sources) tends to negate the survey results of 1973."
Subsequent agency documents indicate that the petition to export avocados  from Michoacan
to the US was given no further consideration.
Sinaloa
The Mexican government was similarly frustrated in its efforts to gain entry for avocados
grown in the state of Sinaloa,  in northwestern Mexico.  APHIS  rejected  the first Sinaloa
petition in 1975 for two reasons.  As before, the agency noted that field inspectors frequently
intercepted avocado pests at the US-Mexican  border.  APHIS  also pointed out that no field
surveys had been completed in Sinaloa to demonstrate that the proposed districts were pest-
free.33
Officials  from APHIS  and  SV subsequently  agreed  to jointly conduct  pest  surveys  in
avocado  growing areas of Sinaloa.  Over the next two years,  scientists from both countries
completed four field surveys  and found no pests of quarantine  significance. 34  In view of this
evidence,  the  agency  reversed its previous position  and  proposed  an export  protocol  for
shipment of avocados from Sinaloa.  Again, the protocol mandated  strict growing, handling,
and shipping procedures and restricted exports to the same states that had been proposed in
the Michoacan protocol.  A letter from the Deputy Administrator  of APHIS to SV in January
1978 indicated that "After agreement is reached with you, we will review the entry status of
avocados with concerned  State officials and avocado  industry representatives." 35
However, newspapers in Mexico prematurely  announced that Sinaloa would be allowed
to export avocados to the US, and news of these stories reached the US press and the US
32Letter  from  James  Lee,  Jr.,  Deputy  Administrator,  APHIS/PPQ  to  Benjamin  Ortega
Cantero, Director, SV, 6/30/76.
33Letter from  T.G.  Darling,  Acting  Deputy  Administrator,  APHIS  to  Benjamin  Ortega
Cantero, Director, SV,  7/5/75.
34Briefing paper, APHIS/IS,  9/17/91.
35Letter from James  O. Lee, Jr.,  Deputy Administrator,  APHIS/PPQ  to Jorge  Gutierrez
Samperio, Director, SV,  1/9/78.
130avocado  industry before APHIS  had notified  industry representatives  about the proposed
changes in the quarantine.36  The California Avocado Advisory Board  [CAAB,  subsequently
renamed  the  California  Avocado  Commission]  hastily  sent  its  own investigation  team to
Sinaloa to search for signs of pest infestation.  The team subsequently reported that they had
found no live weevils, but did find other evidence of weevil infestation.  They asserted that
early spring was not the proper time to survey for these pests, and recommended that another
investigation be made in July or August, when, in their opinion,  a survey would "certainly find
the pests present."37  The industry argued against publication of a proposed rule in the Federal
Register and requested another official  survey.  The USDA agreed to delay its decision until
another field survey was completed.
The field survey was conducted by APHIS  and SV in August and September  1978,  this
time with representatives  of the California  and Florida  producers  also  participating.  The
scientific team surveyed 2,500 trees and 8,600 fruit in a 1,000 hectare area in Sinaloa,  Sonora
and Baja California.  They found no pests of quarantine  significance, but an agency memo  in
September  1978  noted that "Indications  are that Florida  and California  participants
believe  more intensive  surveys  are  indicated  in  Sinaloa." 38  An  industry  publication  also
reported that a board member of the CAAB argued that the investigation was inconclusive. 39
The APHIS internal review of the new survey data and the proposed export protocol for
Sinaloa continued through the fall of 1978.  One APHIS technician expressed  concern about
the lack of information about the life cycles and periods of activity of the insects.  In his view,
the lack of information on the biology of the pests compromised the quality of the surveys.40
Nonetheless, by December  1978, the Acting Deputy Administrator of PPQ expressed the
view that "a sound biological basis exists for permitting  entry of avocados"  from Sinaloa.41
In a reply on behalf of the agency to an inquiry about the avocado  ruling from California's
Senator Alan Cranston,  in support of this conclusion he stated that:
36"Mexican Avocado Growers Eye US Market,"  Alan Myers, Avocado Growers, Volume 2,
Number 5,  5/78.
37 Ibid.,  p. 28.
38Memorandum  for  the  File,  Joseph  Gentry,  Assistant  to  the  Deputy  Administrator,
APHIS/PPQ,  9/15/78.
39According to this account, the industry representative  said, " 'If we were sent down there
on  an incognito basis.  . . if we had eight to  12 weeks, we could prove the seed weevil's
existence.'  "  ("Task Force  Seeks to Block Mexican Fruit," Avocado Grower, Volume  3,
Number 3,  3/79, p. 52.)
4oMemo  from  H.  Shirakawa,  Chief  Staff  Officer,  National  Program  Planning  Staff,
APHIS/PPQ to H. Autry, Chief Staff Officer, Regulatory Services Staff, 11/24/78.
4 1Letter from T.  G. Darling,  Acting Deputy Administrator,  APHIS/PPQ, to  Senator Alan
Cranston  (D.-California),  12/22/78.  The  Commissioner  of Agriculture  of Los  Angeles
County  had asked  Senator  Cranston to look  into the matter (Letter from Paul  Engler to
Senator Alan Cranston,  10/24/78).
131"The  normal  pest risk  evaluation  for decision  making  on permit  issuance  relies
heavily on a search of the published  world literature.  This is supplemented by our
knowledge  of pest distribution  built up  in part by many years'  records  of pest
interceptions.  Seldom do we have the advantage of intimate  knowledge such as
that gained through over 30 years of cooperative programs with Sanidad Vegetal
of the Republic of Mexico,  or the opportunity to conduct pest survey  [sic]  in the
country of origin."
The letter to Senator  Cranston  also  noted that  APHIS  was aware  of the intense  interest
expressed  by avocado producers  in California and Florida and  consequently had "become
extremely  conscious  of economic  as well  as biological  factors."  Senator  Cranston was
assured that any proposed change  in Q56 to allow imports of Mexican avocados would be
published in the Federal Register,  even though this was not a standard regulatory  procedure
at the time.  In closing,  the APHIS  policymaker indicated  that "We.  . . will  announce the
Department's decision only after all positions have been fully considered  and evaluated."  He
also  reminded the senator that, for APHIS's decision,  "Biological  considerations  must, of
necessity,  outweigh economic ones in the final determination."
Five days later, in late December 1978, the Acting Deputy Administrator wrote an internal
memo to "ask that a 'notice of proposed  change in entry status' be prepared for publication
in the Federal Register."42  A few weeks later,  in January  1979, USDA notified the industry
that it intended to publish a proposed change in Q56 in the Federal Register within 60 days.43
In response,  a  "task force"  from  the  CAC  flew to  Washington  in the  first  week  of
February to lobby the congressional  delegations from California and Florida.44  The task force
reported that they visited 71  lawmakers and government officials.  The industry's  position
was that Mexican avocados should be refused entry until every state in Mexico  was found to
be pest-free.  It acknowledged that no weevils had been found in Sinaloa, but pointed out that
weevils were known to infest groves in the adjoining  state of Nayarit.  It also urged that
USDA examine the risk of infestation by Oriental and Mediterranean  fruit flies.
The industry's strategic goal, according to an industry publication, was to prevent a public
hearing from taking place.45  If that effort failed, according to the same source, the industry
planned a public appeal to prevent any alteration to Q56.  However, the public appeal was not
necessary,  as the USDA once again delayed its decision to publish a proposed change to Q56
in the Federal Register.  An article  entitled "Mexican Avocados Turned Back,"  published in
42Memo to G. Rohwer, Director of the National Program Planning Staff, APHIS/PPQ, from
T. Darling, Acting Deputy Administrator,  APHIS/PPQ, 12/27/78.
43"Final  Fight Looms  Over  Mexican Avocado  Imports,"  Alan  Myers,  Avocado Grower,
Volume 3, Number 3, 3/79, p. 27.
44The Secretary of Agriculture reportedly declined to meet with this delegation.
45 Ibid., p. 27.
132the industry press in April,  stated that the Secretary of Agriculture had called the president
of the CAC to inform him that USDA needed to restudy the survey. 46
In June 1979,  an APHIS technician sent a memo to the Deputy Administrator, concerning
repeated inquiries he had received from individuals applying for permits to import avocados
from areas in Sinaloa.  The technician had been advising these individuals that the matter was
under review, but sought the Deputy Administrator's guidance  on the appropriate response.47
He noted  in  his memo  that  "This  office  recommends  that  avocados  from  those  area be
allowed entry."  He went on to propose that "If  it is determined that the problem is economic
rather than biological,  we suggest the Foreign Agricultural  Service [of USDA] may be in the
best position to respond." No written response to this inquiry was found in the agency's files.
Three months later,  APHIS  was  still reviewing  its position concerning  importation  of
avocados from Mexico.48 Thereafter, we can find no mention of this issue in agency records.
The industry achieved its goals of forestalling publication of a proposed rule in the Federal
Register and preventing public hearings  on the issue.  The quarantine  remained in place and
avocados from Sinaloa were never allowed entry into the US.
A Long Lull, 1980-1990
A  review  of the historical  record  shows that APHIS  made only  two relatively  minor
decisions on the issue of Mexican avocados between 1980 and  1990, decisions that reflected
the  agency's increasingly  conservative  position regarding  the potential  entry  of Mexican
avocados.  The first decision was to reject  a request from  SV and APHIS  field personnel  in
1985 to conduct additional field surveys in Michoacan  to determine which areas were pest-
free.49  The  second  decision was  to rescind  three import  permits  that allowed  transit  of
Mexican avocados  across the southwestern US to ports in southern California for eventual
export  to Asia.  In late  1986  and early  1987,  the agency  had issued three  permits which
allowed  in-bond  shipments  of "hard,  green fruit"  in  sealed  containers to travel  on routes
specified by the California Department of Food and Agriculture [CDFA] to Long Beach and
Los Angeles.  When the industry learned of these permits in early 1987,  it mounted  a letter
writing  campaign to reverse the decision,  while  publicly considering  a lawsuit  against the
Director of  the CDFA.50  APHIS reversed its decision in July 1987, publishing an interim rule
in the Federal Register which went into effect immediately without an opportunity for public
4 '  Mexican Avocados  Turned Back," Alan Myers, Avocado Grower, Volume 3, Number 4,
4/79, p.  9.
47Memo to James O. Lee, Jr., Deputy Administrator, APHIS/PPQ,  from H. Autry, Chief Staff
Officer, Regulatory Services Staff, APHIS, 6/4/79.
48Letter to Senator Jake Garn, (R-Utah),  9/14/79.
49Letter from T.  J.  Lanier,  Acting  Director of the National  Program  and Planning  Staff,
APHIS/PPQ to Ed Ayers, Jr.,  Latin American Region, APHIS/PPQ,  8/24/85.
50"Transshipment Flap Heats Up:  Avocado Growers Association Weights Berryhill Lawsuit,"
California  Grower, Volume  11,  Number 4, 4/87, p. 20.
133comment because "an emergency  situation exists."51  The final rule, formally affirming the
interim rule without revision, was published in the Federal Register in December  1987.52
NAFTA-Period  Reevaluation of the Restrictions, 1990-1995
In 1990, Mexico approached the US with a proposal to initiate negotiations toward a free
trade area similar to the agreement reached between Canada and the US  in 1988.  President
Bush accepted the Mexican proposal and one year later trilateral negotiations that included
Canada were begun.  These negotiations were concluded  in August  1992, and NAFTA went
into effect in January 1994.
A key issue for agriculture at the inception  of the NAFTA negotiations was the extent to
which farm products would be included in the negotiations for removal of trade barriers.  This
issue  was broadly  resolved  in February  1992  when  high-level  decisions  were reached  to
include all agricultural  products in the Mexican-US  agreement,  while allowing  adjustment
periods for the domestic industries of up to 15 years.53
Issues related to sanitary and phytosanitary barriers to trade were also addressed  in the
NAFTA negotiations.  Ultimately, one section of the chapter of the agreement on agriculture
addressed sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  The NAFTA countries  agreed to six basic
principals:  each country retained the right to adopt any sanitary and phytosanitary measures
necessary to protect human,  animal,  and plant life and health;  each country retained the right
to  establish  appropriate  levels  of protection;  the  measures  must  be  based  on  scientific
evidence;  the  measures  cannot  discriminate  between  domestic  and  foreign  goods;  each
measure adopted  should be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve  its appropriate
level of protection,  and;  sanitary  and phytosanitary  measures  can not  create  a  disguised
restriction  on  trade  (NAFTA  1993).  A  formal  dispute  settlement  process  was  also
established.  Under this process, if an arbitral panel issues an opinion that an import regulation
violates the NAFTA provisions, the non-compliant country has the option of either changing
the measure or keeping it and compensating the challenging  country for the value of impaired
trade.
The NAFTA negotiations created  an environment  in which technical barriers impeding
trade between Mexico  and the US were  open to renewed  scrutiny.  The avocado  dispute
appeared on the agenda as early as June 1990 when the US Secretary of Agriculture met with
the  Mexican  Minister  of Agriculture  to  discuss  issues  that  might  be  addressed  in  the
negotiations.54  This step signaled the Mexican government's willingness to once  again expend
5 Federal Register, Volume 52, No.  141,  7/23/87,  pp. 27669-27672.
'Avocados  From Mexico Transiting the US to Foreign Countries,"  7 CFR 352, Docket No.
87-132, Volume,  52, No. 239, 12/14/87, pp. 47373-47375.
53See  Orden  for  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of the NAFTA  provisions  for  agriculture.
Unwillingness  of Canada to accept  elimination of trade barriers  and tariffs on agricultural
products led to separate bilateral agricultural agreements among the three countries.
54Memo, D. Scot Campbell, Director, Operational  Support, APHIS/IS, 6/6/90.
134effort and resources to gain entry to the US markets for avocados.  An APHIS representative
told  domestic  growers  that  although  he  didn't  anticipate  that  NAFTA  would  produce
"sweeping  or immediate  changes,"  he did expect  "that issues related  to Mexico  would be
pulled to the forefront and handled with some measure  of additional urgency."
With the benefit of hindsight, we can now observe that the interest by Mexico in renewed
efforts to amend the avocado  quarantine  has led to nearly  five years  of re-evaluation  and
negotiations about avocados.  Since 1990, USDA and  SV scientists have sparred  over data
requirements, research  design, and interpretation of research results.  Debate  has centered on
the assessment of pest populations, the host status of Hass avocados for fruit flies,  and the
adequacy  of various  proposed  pest-risk  mitigation  strategies.  This  debate,  which  has
dominated the agenda of many of the technical exchanges of a joint Phytosanitary Working
Group  has been  closely  monitored  by  industry  representatives,  trade  policymakers,  and
elected  officials  in  both  countries.  The  principal  events  over  the  past  five  years  are
summarized  in Table 2.
Development of Mexico's Proposed Work Plan
Shortly after the Ministerial meeting,  SV submitted a work plan entitled "Work Plan to
Produce  Avocados  of the Best  Quality."  The  work  plan  proposed  that  APHIS  allow
avocados produced  and marketed under the terms of SV's export registration program in the
state of Michoacan  to enter the US.  APHIS quickly rejected the work plan.  The principal
flaw cited by APHIS was that it addressed only one of the insect species that concerned  the
agency.  However,  APHIS regarded four species of host-specific  pests and four species  of
fruit flies as "pests of quarantine significance."56  Since there were no effective post-harvest
treatments to  eradicate  these pests on Hass  avocados,  the  agency  wanted  SV  to  supply
evidence that a specified area was free of a pest, or evidence that  a pest did not attack Hass
avocados before it considered  a change to Q56.57
When US and Mexican animal and plant health officials met in October  1990, the Mexican
delegation  agreed to  submit another  work plan.58  The  second work  plan was to include
evidence that the proposed districts in Michoacan were free of host-specific  pests, along with
55Speech  by  Robert  L.  Griffin,  APHIS/PPQ  to  California-Mexico  Agricultural  Trade
Conference,  San Diego, California, 6/27/91.
56The four host-specific pests were: Heilipus  lauri, Conotrachelus  aguacatae,  and C.  perseae
(seed  weevils),and  Stenoma catenifer (a  seed  moth).  The  four  fruit  fly  species  were
Anastrepha  ludens (the Mexican fruit fly),  A. fraterculus,  A. serpentina,  and  A. striata.
57Letter from A. Thiermann,  Deputy Administrator,  International  Services,  APHIS,  to  J.
Gutierrez, Director General, SV,  10/1/90.
5 8Minutes  of Meeting  of US-Mexico  Free  Trade  Initiatives,  Animal  and  Plant  Health,
10/31/90.
135Table 2.  A chronology  of the avocado  case,  1990-95
1990  June  The avocado issue is resurrected at the Ministerial  level during meetings to discuss
multilateral and bilateral trade issues.
APHIS rejects SV's work plan because it addresses quality, not pest risk; APHIS
October  asks for proof that the proposed districts are free of four fruit flies  and four
avocado pests.
1991  August/September  SV resubmits work plan (avocado  pest survey results  are submitted later when
survey is complete);  APHIS asks for information on a fifth avocado pest; plant
health officials begin to discuss using a systems approach to mitigate pest risk.
1992  May  APHIS rejects work plan principally because the agency thought that the research
which examined the host status of Hass avocados for fruit flies was inadequate.
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two governments;  APHIS
June  tentatively accepts evidence that proposed districts are free of avocado pests.
Bi-National Technical Meeting to determine data requirements  to examine host
July  status of Hass avocados for fruit flies.
USDA/ARS suggests substantial modification to Mexico's proposed research
August  protocol to test host status of Hass avocados.
Proposal to allow exports of Mexican avocados to Alaska is published in the
October  Federal Register;  SV resubmits a revised work plan for export to the mainland.
1993  June  After numerous technical meetings to resolve outstanding  issues, APHIS states
that insufficient information on fruit flies (population levels, Hass avocado host
status) precludes a decision.
July  Final rule allowing exports of Mexican avocados to Alaska is published in the
Federal Register.
November  SV and APHIS jointly determine research protocol to test host status of Hass
avocados for fruit flies.
1994  June  SV submits work plan with results of fruit fly host status research.
SV submits a slightly revised work plan along with pest population data.
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is published in the Federal Register;
hearings  are held in California and Florida
1995  July  Proposed Rule published recommending the regulations be amended to allow
fresh Hass avocado fruit grown in approved orchards in approved municipalities
in Michoacan, Mexico to be imported into the northeastern area of the US, subject
__  _  __  _  to certain conditions.
136research results which would demonstrate that Hass avocados  were not a host for  fruit flies,
diminishing the importance of fruit fly population levels in the Michoacan  avocado growing
regions. 59
Nearly a year passed before SV submitted its second work plan.  Evaluation of the work
plan by APHIS was  delayed further in late  1991  because the pest surveys and research  had
not been completed.  In the meantime, plant  health officials continued to discuss a number of
outstanding  avocado issues. 6 0
The most important discussions between APHIS and SV centered  on consideration  of a
systems  approach  to  mitigate  the  pest  risk  associated  with  importing  avocados  from
Michoacan.  The US delegation  to the bilateral  discussions outlined  a seven-point  export
protocol that "would combine various procedures which in their totality could possibly allow
Mexico to move Mexican avocados to limited areas of the United States without  risk to US
avocado  production  areas." 61  Discussion  of such  a  systems  approach  signaled  official
recognition that it was increasingly unlikely for the proposed  districts in Michoacan to be
designated as pest-free.
In May  1992,  APHIS  refused  to  accept  the  revised  SV  work  plan.  The  principal
shortcoming cited was that the fruit fly host  status research had  not been conducted  with
sufficient  scientific  rigor.62  APHIS  argued  that not  only would  SV have to increase  the
number of fruit in its controlled experiments,  but it would also have to sample a minimum of
100,000 fruit in the field under different environmental conditions  and at different times of the
year to demonstrate that Hass avocados were not a fruit fly host.  APHIS  also asked  SV to
substantiate  some of its claims  about  eradication  of host-specific  pests in the Michoacan
avocado  groves.
The request for additional information to support the host-specific pest-free status of the
proposed Michoacan  districts was quickly addressed by SV.  One month after the request,
USDA and Mexico's Ministry of Agriculture signed a Memorandum  of Understanding which
stated that the US tentatively agreed that "Based on information provided by Mexico the US
accepts  that avocado  fruit from areas  in Michoacan  determined through  survey  and fruit
cutting are free of seed pests.' "63
Agreement  on the risk posed by fruit flies would prove to be more elusive.  A group of
experts from the federal  and state governments of both countries met  again in July  1992 to
59 Letter from Glen Lee, Deputy Administrator, PPQ, to J. Gutierrez, Director, SV, 5/28/92.
6°For  example,  the US  delegation  asked  SV for  evidence  that the  proposed  districts  in
Michoacan were free of a stem weevil, Copturus  aguacate,  another host-specific pest that had
recently been intercepted by border patrols on contraband avocados.
61Draft of Briefing Paper:  Avocados from Mexico, APHIS/IS, 9/17/91.
62Letter from Glen Lee, Deputy Administrator, PPQ, to J. Gutierrez, SV,  5/28/92.
63Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the US  - Mexico  Technical Working Group, June  18,
1992.
137address this issue.  This would prove to be a pivotal -- and contentious -- meeting  about the
data required to support the claim that Hass avocados were not a host for fruit flies.64  An
ARS  participant  in the meeting noted that unpublished  studies showed that Hass avocados
were hosts to fruit flies.  Another ARS delegate pointed out that since avocados in general
were "good hosts,"  a research protocol to demonstrate that the Hass variety was not would
have to be  quite rigorous.  An APHIS  official concurred,  pointing out  that any proposed
change to Q56 would be "scrutinized."
The  Mexican  delegation's  position  was  substantially  different.  In  SV's  view,  four
observations supported a research protocol that was less extensive than that proposed by the
US delegates.  First, A.  ludens populations were low at the altitudes where avocados orchards
were  located.  Second,  the  other two  fruit  fly  species  under  discussion  had  never  been
observed  in the Michoacan  area.  Third,  although the  published  scientific  literature  had
documented the susceptibility of some varieties of avocados  to fruit flies, the evidence that
thick-skinned  Hass avocado was a host was  scant, dated,  and anecdotal.  Fourth, evidence
of fruit fly infestation had not been found in exported avocados during the past 20 to 25 years.
The Mexican delegation's arguments did not persuade US plant health officials to change
their position on the requirement for additional  research.  Reluctantly,  SV officials agreed at
the  conclusion  of the  meeting  to  draw  up  a  research  protocol  that  would  examine  the
susceptibility  of Hass  avocados  to  three  species  of fruit  flies.65  An  ARS  official  also
recommended that SV officials begin to develop trapping data in the growing area to support
their assertions about the absence or minimal presence of  these fruit  fly species.
In August  1992, ARS officials reviewed the research protocol  submitted by SV.  Again,
ARS concluded that the proposed research was inadequate to prove non-host status for Hass
avocados.  This conclusion was based in part  on recent ARS research that had shown that
fruit flies would oviposit on Hass avocados under forced-infestation laboratory conditions.
SV submitted its third work plan, which explicitly featured a systems approach to mitigate
risk, in October  1992.66  Although  SV proposed extensive risk mitigation procedures  in its
work plan, it provided little or no information to substantiate its assertions that avocado pests
had  been eradicated,  fruit  fly  populations  were  low,  and  that  fruit flies would  not  infest
unharvested Hass avocados.  The emphasis on extensive risk mitigation  procedures rather
than on an extensive risk assessment indicated that, in SV's view,  APHIS only needed to be
64"Mexican Bi-National  Technical Meeting on Data Requirements to Support Non-Fruit Fly
Status for Hass Variety Avocados,"  memo from S.  Sudduth, Senior Agricultural Biologist,
Pest Exclusion  Branch,  California Department of  Food  and Agriculture,  to Isi  Siddiqui,
Assistant Director, Division of Plant Industry, 7/17/92.
65The US delegation announced that further review of the literature had prompted them to
drop their request for information  on one fruit fly species, Anastrephafraterculus.
66"Preclearance  Work Plan for  Shipment of Hass Variety Avocados  From Mexico  to the
United  States,"  Direccion  General  de Sanidad Vegetal, Government  of Mexico,  October,
1992.
138concerned  with the pest status of the commodity at the end  of the risk mitigation  system.
Nonetheless, many of the ARS and APHIS scientists who reviewed the proposed work plan
continued  to  criticize  Mexico  for  its  failure  to  provide  information  that would  allow  a
rigorous pest risk assessment,  noting that such an assessment  would be a necessary first  step
in designing an effective system to mitigate risk. Although the internal USDA debate over the
new work  plan  continued  for  several  months,  the final  consensus  once  again  was  that
Mexico's work plan was incomplete.
Although Mexico's  efforts to develop an adequate work plan for exporting Michoacan
avocados  to the US mainland remained unsuccessful,  in the fall of 1992 USDA published  a
proposed  rule  in the  Federal  Register  to  allow Mexico  to  export  avocados  to  Alaska.67
APHIS received  more than 300 comments  opposing this rule change.  Most of the criticism
centered  on the likelihood of illegal transshipments of avocados  from Alaska to the mainland,
and the subsequent potential pest-infestation risk.  However, USDA concluded that none of
the information  in these  comments overturned  the adequacy of the safeguards  reported  in
APHIS'  original pest risk assessment.  A final rule allowing Mexican avocado  exports into
Alaska was published in July  1993.68
In the first few months of 1993,  APHIS and SV officials continued to try to resolve the
impasse on Mexico's work plan in a series of meetings  of the joint Phytosanitary  Working
Group.  At a meeting in mid-1993, the US delegation indicated that they were still unable to
assess Mexico's third work plan because of insufficient information about the risk posed by
fruit  flies  in  the  avocado  producing  districts.  A  sub-group  of  scientists  within  the
Phytosanitary Working Group, which had been established  at the suggestion of the Director
of SV to  lay out  a framework  for resolving  the fruit fly issues,  continued to negotiate the
details of data requirements  and research design for assessing fly-related risks throughout the
summer and fall of 1993.  In November  1993, USDA and  SV signed a protocol that outlined
the research that SV would undertake with oversight and review provided by US plant health
officials.69
By June  1994, the fruit-fly host-status research  on Hass avocados was complete.  SV
submitted  the results to the US  delegation  at the Phytosanitary  Working  Group  meeting,
along with a new work plan.  On July 5, 1994, the Mexican government formally  requested
that APHIS  amend is import regulations to permit entry of avocados from approved  orchards
in specified municipalities  in Michoacan.  70
The main points addressed in the July  1994 work plan are summarized in Table  3. Mexico
asserted that its survey results demonstrated that the host-specific avocado pests had
67Federal Register, Volume 57, No. 202, Monday, 10/19/92,  p. 47573.
68Federal Register, Volume 58, No.  142, Tuesday, 7/27/93,  p. 40033.
69"Protocol  for testing  host  status  of avocados  for  fruit flies  of the genus  Anastrepha,"
APHIS,  11/93.
70Federal Register,  7 CFR Part 319, Docket 94-116-1,  pp. 59070 - 71,  11/15/94.
139Table 3.  Summary of the Mexican  work plan for avocados  and the responses  of the
domestic  industry
Risk Factor/  Mexico's  Reported Research Results and
Mitigation Procedures  Proposed "Work Plan"  US Industry's Position
Prevalence of pest  SV's  1994 field survey established that avocado  Weevils and the moth  are frequently
seed and  stem weevils and the seed moth are  intercepted  in contraband  shipments of
not found in the districts in Michoacan which  Mexican avocados;  the 1994  sampling for
satisfy the requirements of the Ministry's export  avocado-specific  pests was limited.
program.
SV's  1994-94 fruit fly field  surveys  did little
SV's 1993-94 fruit fly field surveys showed  to establish  the population or seasonal
that population  levels ofA. ludens (Mexican  abundance of fruit  flies because  of small
fruit fly) are low in the avocado-producing  areas  samples, brief exposure times,
of Michoacan,  primarily because avocados are  undocumented  climatic factors, site
grown at elevations that are inhospitable  for  limitations, and improperly monitored traps;
fruit flies; A. ludens population levels are  despite these limitations, 53 fruit flies (A.
especially low during the avocado harvest  ludens) were found in the  sampled orchards;
period; the other species of fruit flies were never  lower temperatures  at higher altitudes retard
detected in field  surveys.  but do not eradicate  pest populations;  the
survey data indicated that fruit flies were
present throughout the harvest season.
Pest detection  Foliage, branches,  and soil is inspected for  Proposed sampling  procedures for host-
(inspection and  weevils;  baited traps are set to monitor fruit fly  specific pests and fruit flies in orchards and
sampling activities)  populations.  in packinghouses is insufficient to provide
quarantine  security  for large-volume  exports;
Fruit is routinely inspected for pests.  In 1993-  the proposed  fruit fly trapping protocol (1
94, 405,534 avocados were sampled for  trap for every ten hectares) is insufficient to
evidence of fruit fly and/or fruit fly larvae, and  detect low-level infestations.
none were infested.
All inspection,  sampling, and monitoring
activities will be periodically inspected by
USDA officials.
Host status of Hass  Hass avocados are a host for seed and stem  Hass avocados  are a host of the seed  and
avocado  weevils and seed moths.  stem weevils and seed moth.
Mexico's  1993-94 study of the fruit fly host  Mexico's  research results showed that fruit
status of Hass avocados  indicated that 1) Hass  flies readily infested Hass avocados in the
avocados showed resistance to forced  laboratory; the forced infestation  field
infestations  in the field using high populations  experiments  relied on low fly densities, small
of fruit flies to apply  pressure on the fruit; 2)  sample  sizes, and limited exposure times; a
under natural field conditions, Hass avocados  natural resistance to infestation while on the
are not infested with fruit flies; 3)  fruit attached  tree has not been systematically proven.
to the tree have a natural resistance to
infestation regardless of when harvested.
Pre-harvest treatment  Routine cultural practices and chemical controls  The US industry principally relies on
prevent pest infestation; malathion is used to  integrated pest management to control pests
control fruit flies; malathion and methyl  and introduction of chemical  controls would
parathion are used to prevent seed weevil  upset the ecological balance;  should
infestation; should stem weevils ever be  infestation occur, quarantines would disrupt
detected, affected branches  can be pruned and  domestic and export shipments and increase
burned and methyl parathion can be sprayed  pest monitoring and eradication costs.
over the entire orchard (methyl parathion  is not
registered for use in the US, but the US does
have established import tolerances).
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Harvest  practices  Required degree of maturity minimizes the  The research  results that report correlations
probability that the fruit will be infested; fruit  between infestations with stage of maturity
infested with weevils will drop to the ground  are "incomplete,  poorly organized,
long before they are ripe enough  to be  incorrectly  analyzed  and inconclusive";  there
harvested, so packing  only fruit that has been  is no definitive evidence that fruit infested
picked directly from the tree provides another  with seed weevils immediately falls  to the
safeguard; fallen fruit must be removed and  ground, therefore special harvesting
destroyed daily.  techniques provide  no additional safeguards.
Post-harvest commodity  There are no USDA approved treatments to  There are no USDA approved treatments to
treatment to eliminate  eliminate the pests without damaging the fruit  eliminate  the pests without damaging the
pests  or leaving unacceptable chemical residues.  fruit or leaving unacceptable  chemical
residues.
Eligibility of orchards  Only orchards in municipalities  that comply  APHIS oversight of the implementation and
and packing houses  with the terms of the Ministry's  export program  operation  of a complex work plan will absorb
are permitted to export; should sampling yield  a lot of resources  that could be better used for
evidence of pest infestation, the Ministry will  other purposes.
suspend the authorization of the orchard or the
packing house to export avocados for the rest of
the season or until corrective  action is taken;
evidence of infestation  of one fruit means that
the entire lot must be rejected; a grove or
packing house will not be re-authorized  to
export until Ministry and APHIS officials agree
that the problem has been rectified; any packing
house that receives avocados from unregistered
orchards or otherwise fails to comply with the
requirements of the export program  will have its
registration and export certification
automatically  canceled.
Packing and shipping  Packing houses must monitor fruit fly  The Mexican data from the 1993-94  research
requirements  populations  on site and verify the absence of  study on the host status of Hass avocados
pests through random  sampling,  showed that the avocados were susceptible  to
Fruit will be packed in new, boxes, and labeled  fruit fly infestation within 3 hours of harvest,
with the names and registration  numbers of the  so avocados could  become infested before
grower and the packer.  The boxes must be  they were packed;  packing and shipping
sealed and stamped with Ministry seals.  requirements constitute part of a "systems
An International Phytosanitary Certificate  is  approach" which does not adequately
required for each shipment; fruit must be  safeguard American agriculture.
transported  to the US in closed, refrigerated
vehicles; fruit will be sampled at the border by
US officials; APHIS will specify transportation
modes and routines within the US.
Distribution restrictions  The protocol calls for export to  19 states in the  If  the avocados  exported  by Mexico under
northeast US as a final safeguard for US  the proposed systems approach reduces the
avocado orchards; the US government would  risk to American agriculture to acceptable
be responsible for preventing commercial  levels, Mexico should not have to propose
transshipment of avocados in the US.  limiting distribution to 19 northeastern states.
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Conclusion  Under the proposed  systems approach, exports  Mexico's pest risk assessment  is based upon
of avocados  from Michoacan  will not introduce  seriously deficient research  and limited pest
harmful exotic pests into the US.  Mexico has  survey data; Mexico's  proposed risk
exported  avocados to Canada, Europe and  management  strategies developed  from their
Japan for many years without incident.  risk assessment will be ineffective in meeting
the necessary and appropriate  level of
quarantine security.
Sources: Work Plan (including Annexes)  for the Exportation of Hass Avocados from Mexico to the USA, SARH (Ministry of
Agriculture  and  Water Resources),  September  1994;  and  Statement by the California  Avocado Commission  before  the
USDA/APHIS at the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking  [Hearing] Concerning  the Importation of Fresh Hass Avocado
Fruit Grown in Michoacan, Mexico, Docket No. 94-116-1,  December 1994.
been eliminated from the districts participating in the avocado  export program and that fruit
fly populations were low in these districts.  It outlined monitoring activities for future pest
detection  and presented  evidence that fruit flies do not attack unharvested  Hass avocados
under actual growing conditions.  It also specified pre-harvest,  harvest, packing,  transport,
shipping,  and distribution procedures that would minimize the risk of there being  any pests
on exported avocados.  SV concluded  that the low prevalence of pests and extensive risk-
mitigation  practices  detailed  in  the work plan  constituted  a  system  approach  that  posed
negligible risk for US agriculture.  On this basis, Mexico requested that Q56 be modified to
allow  issuance  of permits  for imports  of avocados  into  19  northeastern  states  during the
November-February  period of peak harvest  in Michoacan.
ARS scientists, who had consistently been critical of the Mexican research effort over the
previous  three  years,  continued  to find  fault  with the  execution  of part  of the  research
conducted under the joint protocol.  Nonetheless,  they concluded:
"The  overall  comparison  of  lab[oratory]  and  field  cage  Hass  avocados
demonstrated  (in agreement with other studies of avocados) that fruit attached to
the tree shows considerable resistance to fruit fly attack and this resistance  coupled
with other components of a systems approach has great promise as a quarantine
procedure."
The ARS review also concluded that:
"Data  in  this  report  indicate  that  quarantine  security  for export  of Michoacan
avocados to the US  may be achieved for Anastrepha  spp. fruit flies by developing
a systems approach (including adequate trapping.)"71
Over the next three months, US  officials worked with their Mexican counterparts  on
minor revisions to the work plan.  In September  1994, the proposed work plan was viewed
71"ARS  Review of Research Report  from Mexico  on Host  Status of Hass  Avocado  for
Anastrepha Fruit Flies", Ken Vick, National Program Leader,  Stored Product Insects and
Plant Quarantine, USDA/ARS,  7/21/1994.
142as complete and Mexico now requested an amendment to allow avocado  imports under the
conditions  of the work plan throughout the year.  The following month,  SV submitted the
required pest population survey data.
On November  15,  1994, APHIS published an "Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and  Public  Meetings"  in the  Federal  Register.72  The  notice  indicated  that  APHIS  was
reviewing a request from the Government of Mexico to export Hass avocados from approved
orchards in approved municipalities in Michoacan  to 19  states in the northeast of the US. 73
It also invited public comment on the work plan and announced that hearings would be held
at the end of November  in San Diego, California and Homestead, Florida.
Industry Opposition  to Changes in the Quarantine
From the outset of the NAFTA negotiations in 1990, the domestic industry had  nervously
monitored the discussions for evidence that the avocado  quarantine might be changed.  As
early as 1991,  one APHIS representative reported that "nearly every inquiry, every telephone
call,  and almost every piece of correspondence I have recently received  with regard to the
US-Mexico Free Trade Initiative has included a reference to the potential  for authorizing the
importation of fresh avocados from Mexico."" 74  APHIS subsequently made numerous  efforts
to keep the industry apprised of its discussions and correspondence with SV.75
One concern frequently expressed by the industry was that the avocado  quarantine would
be sacrificed to the political initiative underlying the trade agreement negotiations.  This claim
might  be  termed  an  aggressive  strategy by the industry  in the  sense  that  it  reverses  the
conventional  political economy  argument  of capture  of regulatory processes  by domestic
interest  groups.  Numerous declarations  were made by the US  growers to the effect  that
"science might be traded off in a rush to sign a trade deal;" 76 that despite the "yeoman service
in  protecting  the  California  industry"  by  USDA's  field  representatives,  "political
considerations  make  the science  almost  irrelevant;" 77  that the  Mexican  government  was
treating the avocado  pest  issues  as "a political  problem that can be overcome by political
72Federal Register,  7 CFR Part 319, Docket 94-116-1, pp.  59070 - 71,  11/15/94.
73 Under the proposal for exports only to the northeastern US,  San Diego is  1,723  miles from
the closest major distribution point (Chicago) and Miami is  1,020 miles from the closest major
distribution point (Philadelphia).  By comparison,  the Mexican  avocado growers have now
been exporting for many years to France.  Major French distribution centers  in the southeast
(Marseilles) and southwest (Toulouse)  are approximately 640 and 510 miles from Grenada,
the heart of Spain's avocado producing region.
74Speech  by  Robert  L.  Griffin,  APHIS/PPQ  to  California-Mexico  Agricultural  Trade
Conference, San Diego, California, 6/27/91.
75Transcript of the Meeting in Homestead, FL,  11/28/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, p.  16.
76"Free Trade with Mexico," Betsey Blanchard Chess, Cahfornia  Grower, 6/91,  p.  19.
77"Mexicans Play Hardball in NAFTA Negotiations,"  Willard Thompson, Cahfornia  Grower,
7/92, p.  8.
143persuasion--not  an  issue  that  will  be  decided  by  scientific  evidence;" 78  or  that  "an
opportunistic US government may be susceptible to allowing goodwill politics to supersede
science." 79
The publication in November  1994 of an advanced  notice of proposed rulemaking was
indicative  of the controversial  character of the avocado quarantine  decision.  The industry
press  reported that its  sources "confirmed  that the powerful  CAC  and  other interests  are
indeed  using  political  clout  to  stall  the  new  rule.  The  CAC,  for  example,  sought  the
publication of an advance notice of proposed rulemaking,  even though this is normally only
done when the agency needs more information or does not know what impact the rulemaking
might have.  In this case,  sources said, the consequences of the rule are well understood and
the publication of a proposed rule would have been the more normal move."80  The USDA
confirmed that it was not required  by law to publish an advance notice but that it sometimes
chose to do so when it was "deeply concerned about getting the public's comments and the
industry's comments. "81
The opposition to Mexico's proposed work plan was both vocal and industrious at the
public hearings.  In nearly nine hours of testimony at the two hearings, about  sixty people--
including growers, industry representatives,  state and local government  officials,  and scientific
consultants--voiced  their objections.  APHIS  also  received  written  comments  from  291
individuals who opposed changing the terms of the quarantine.  Most of the letters were from
growers in California,  but opposition  was also registered  by prominent  participants  in the
agricultural policy community,  such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Western
Growers  Association,  and  the  Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable  Association.  Twenty-four
members of the Californian delegation to Congress also  signed letters that opposed changes
in the quarantine.
The most well-orchestrated  opposition was coordinated by the CAC.  The CAC submitted
a 266-page report for the record and its representatives testified at both hearings.  The CAC's
written submission included commissioned reports and letters from entomologists  and tropical
fruit specialists,  entomology journal articles, letters and comments from current and retired
government scientists,  and several studies on the economic impacts of pest infestation.
At the heart  of the  CAC  argument  was the  claim  that  allowing  imports  of Mexican
avocados under the systems approach proposed in the 1994 work plan posed an unacceptable
risk of pest infestation to domestic groves.  The industry's critical  views of the work plan are
summarized in Table 3.  The industry asserted that the surveys of pest prevalence had failed
to establish low population levels in the Michoacan growing  area.  It also  argued that the
7 S.  Taft and N. Traner, The Eco Farms Grower newsletter, 3/27/91.
79"Accepting  avocado exports,"  The Packer, 12/26/94.
soWorld Food Chemical News, 1/11/95,  p. 4.
81Statement by Jeffrey Kirmsee, Office  of the General Counsel, USDA.  Transcript of the
Meeting in San Diego, CA, 11/29/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
p.  12-13.
144proposed monitoring protocols were inadequate and that Hass avocados are a better host of
fruit flies than Mexico  acknowledged.  It pointed out that no  approved  post-harvest  pest
treatments are available and argued that the proposed pre-harvest,  harvest, packing, transport,
shipping,  and  distribution measures did not sufficiently  mitigate the pest risk.  The industry
also felt that APHIS oversight of the proposed system for pest-risk mitigation would divert
resources  from  other important  activities.  Given these  views,  the industry expressed  its
concern that any infestations of domestic groves that resulted  from importation  of Mexican
avocados would be costly to contain due to US pesticide regulations  and the close proximity
of the groves to residential neighborhoods.
To bolster its case, the domestic industry emphasized  the intricate monitoring, trapping
and control systems utilized by California growers.  Under this system, the industry had been
able to rely primarily  on biological  controls.  The industry  argued that use of a biological
control system was particularly important given the close proximity of the domestic groves
to  urban  and  suburban  residential  neighborhoods  and  the  consequent  difficulties  they
encountered  in  the use  of cost-effective  aerial  applications  of chemical  pesticides.  Any
relaxation of the quarantine on importation of Mexican avocados would raise pest monitoring
costs for its intricate  system of pest control, the industry argued.  Were infestation to occur,
eradication  costs  would  rise and  mandatory  quarantines  would  disrupt  markets.  A  state
government  official  noted  that  since  1984  California  had  incurred  expenses  of over  $5.5
million to eradicate  incipient  infestations  of the Mexican  fruit fly alone.82  Moreover, the
recent appearance  of the perseae mite from Mexico  had resulted in an increase in pesticide
use in San Diego County from less than 14 ounces of pesticides  per acre in  1991 to over 2.62
pounds in 1992 and 3.75 pounds in  1993.83
Representatives of the California avocado industry also expressed reservations  about the
ability  of Mexico  to  guarantee  that the  pest risk  mitigation  procedures  included  in  its
proposed systems  approach  for avocado  exports would  be rigorously implemented  in the
field.  One grower expressed  this view by asserting that Mexico  had neither "the financial
resources,  the technical  expertise,  and the trained  manpower,  nor the dedication  and the
determination  to enforce the changes  that are required to make Mexican  avocados  safe to
bring into the US."'84  The president  of the California Avocado  Society remarked  similarly
that "Anyone who  has traveled or done business to any extent in Mexico recognizes that at
82Statement  by  A.  J.  Yates,  Deputy  Secretary,  California  Department  of  Food  and
Agriculture.  Transcript of the Meeting in San Diego, CA, 11/29/94 to discuss the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,  p. 60.
83Statement  by  K.  Thuner,  County  Agriculture  Commissioner  of  San  Diego  County.
Transcript  of the Meeting in San Diego,  CA,  11/29/94 to discuss the Advance Notice  of
Proposed Rulemaking, p. 66.
84Transcript of the Meeting in San Diego,  CA, 11/29/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, p.  114.
145the village level through the upper echelon to the pre-government 85 [sic], well placed and well
times [sic] gratuities facilitate business operations throughout Mexico."86
On the basis of their various objections,  the California avocado growers were united in
recommending that the proposed work plan for amending the avocado quarantine be rejected.
On behalf of the industry, the CAC proposed that Mexico  should  not be allowed  to export
avocados unless:
1)  Mexico can establish pest free zones;
2)  the avocados are treated with a pesticide which assures,  at a very high probability
level, that exotic pests and diseases are eliminated;  or
3)  additional  scientific research is conducted  which unequivocally  establishes that
Hass avocados are not hosts of exotic pests which are injurious to avocados  and
other fruits and vegetables grown in the US.87
The CAC position would effectively preclude importation of Hass avocados from Mexico
for the foreseeable future.  The first condition,  establishing and maintaining  a pest free zone,
requires substantial eradication,  monitoring,  and domestic  quarantine enforcement  costs well
beyond  the  perimeters  of commercial  export groves.  To  do  so  might  eventually  prove
technically  feasible, but would probably be regarded  as uneconomical  by Mexican  officials
who believe the current pest risk is  already negligible.  On the second condition, all parties
agree  that no adequate  post-harvest  treatment  is  available.  The third  condition,  strictly
interpreted,  also cannot be met.  The results of SV's 1993-94 fruit fly host status research
already  indicate  that fruit  flies  will  attack  Hass  avocados  shortly  after  they  have  been
harvested.  Additional research to rigorously establish the host status of unharvested Hass
avocados may only confirm that they are non-preferred  hosts, instead of the higher standard
of "unequivocal non-host" that the CAC recommended.
Other Views on Amending the Regulations
In contrast to the vehement opposition to amending the avocado  quarantine expressed by
the  CAC  and  other  California  growers,  some  less-vocal  support  for  such  a  ruling  also
developed.  While  only  a  few individuals--principally  importers--who  favored  access  for
Mexican avocados testified at the two hearings, APHIS received  59 comments in favor of the
proposed  rule  change,  including  45  from  the Mexican  avocado  industry  and  10  from
85This is probably a reference to the Partido Revolucionario  Institucional  (PRI, which is
pronounced "pre" in Spanish), the political party that has dominated Mexico's executive and
legislative branches for many decades.
86Statement by Larry Rose, President, California Avocado Society.  Transcript of the Meeting
in San Diego, CA,  11/29/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, p.  142.
87Statement by the CAC for Docket No. 94-116-1,  ANPR Concerning the Importation of
Fresh Hass Avocado Fruit Grown in Michoacan,  Mexico, 01/02/95,  p. 2.
146importers.  The Commissioner of Agriculture of Texas expressed  support for the importation
of avocados  from  Mexico  not  only  into  the  northeast,  but  also  into  the  southern  and
southwestern  US.  He wrote that "If the work the US Department of Agriculture  has done
in conjunction with the Mexican Department  of Agriculture  is sufficient for the states in the
northwestern  [sic]  section of the US,  it should also be sufficient for the rest of the country.
This protocol has been delayed for almost two years now, and many residents of Texas  are
interested in the safe importation of the Mexican avocados." 88
Compared to the strong conviction by California avocado growers that the  surveys in
Michoacan had failed to establish an adequate basis for determining the prevalence of pests
or the pest risks from imported Hass avocados, there was also a noticeable lack of concern
about pest infestations risk among some US fruit producers that might be expected to express
concern.  California avocado  growers asserted that "the Mexican proposal  places not only the
California agriculture community at great risk but also endangers  the livelihood of growers
cultivating  a wide range  of fruits and vegetables in Florida, Louisiana, Arizona, Texas,  and
other  states."" 89  However,  in contrast  with  the  California  industry,  the  Florida  avocado
industry's  criticism  was  muted:  the  Chairman  of the  Florida  Avocado  Administrative
Committee simply wrote a one page letter to question Mexico's work plan.  No growers from
states other than Florida or California--such  as  citrus producers  in Arizona  or stone fruit
producers  in  Georgia  who  might  also  be  affected  by  fruit  fly  infestations--registered
opposition to the proposed importation of Mexican avocados.
Representatives  from California's tree fruit industry  also voiced their concern that the
Mexican government would continue to use unjustified technical barriers to bar  imports of
US  stone fruits  such as peaches,  nectarines  and plums in order to build political  pressure
against the US quarantine of Mexican avocados.  For example,  the president of the Northwest
Horticultural  Council  urged  APHIS  to  "work  with  the  same  expediency  and  scientific
justification  desired  of its  counterparts  in Mexico  when  consideration  is  sought  for the
proposed  exportation of a US commodity to their country."  His letter to APHIS  stated that
the  success  of the  efforts  of  the Northwest  Horticultural  Council  to  gain  access  to the
Mexican market for stone fruit "hinge on the ability of Mexico's  producers of products such
as Hass avocados to secure access to the US  market."90
The  US  growers  of other  fruits  continued  their  argument  by  asserting  that  southern
California avocado  growers were using their own political influence  to delay an  inevitable
market  opening,  with  detrimental  effects  on  US exports  of the  other commodities.  The
California avocado growers  were accused of "doing business  on both sides of the border
8 Letter from  Commissioner  of Agriculture  of Texas  to Chief, Regulatory  Analysis  and
Development, APHIS,  12/13/94.
89Statement  by Tom Belimar,  Vice President  of the  CAC.  Transcript of the Meeting  in
Homestead, FL, 11/28/94 to discuss the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,  p. 97.
9 Letter from C.  Schlect, President, Northwest Horticultural Council, to Chief, Regulatory
Analysis and Development, APHIS/PPD,  12/8/94.
147while hamstringing  exports by others."91  An editorial in  The Packer quoted a Washington
State apple exporter who said, "The avocado industry seems to be saying what we heard from
the Japanese for 20-some years." 92
APHIS's Proposed Rule
On July 3, 1995, APHIS  published a proposed rule on the importation of avocados from
Mexico  in the  Federal  Register.  The  proposed  rule  recommended  that  the  quarantine
regulations be amended to allow "fresh Hass avocado fruit grown in approved orchards in
approved municipalities in Michoacan, Mexico to be imported into certain areas of the United
States,  subject to certain conditions."93  The announcement gave notice of five public hearings
to be held on the proposed rule during August  1995 and stated that public comments would
be received through October 16,  1995.
In the proposed  rule,  APHIS reported  the findings  of its independent  evaluation of the
Mexican work plan and its responses to the comments received  in response to its advanced
notice of proposed rulemaking.  The main points from the proposed rule are summarized  in
Table 4.
APHIS  defended the use of a systems approach  to  mitigating pest risk in its proposed
rule,  citing other situations in which a systems approach was used by the United  States to
facilitate  import  and  export  of fruits  and vegetables,  and  the  success  of the  SV  system
approach  for  exporting  avocados  to  Japan.94  APHIS asserted  that  the  nine  mitigation
measures95 which are elements of their proposed systems approach went beyond the Mexican
work plan of September  1994 in response to its concurrence with many of the comments that
suggested "some additional safeguards would be necessary  to prevent introduction of plant
91David Miller  as quoted  in "US Avocado  Growers  Say Mexico  Ban  Still Needed,"  Brian
Johns, Journal  of Commerce, 3/1/95.
92"He calls them like he sees them, and he calls this one foul,"  The Packer, Tom Karst, 5/1/95.
93 Federal Register,  7 CFR Part 319, Docket 94-116-3,  pp.  34832-34842,  07/03/95.
94Japan is well-known for its vigilance  in enforcing exacting phytosanitary regulations.  It does
not  need  to be  concerned  about  host-specific  pests  because  avocados  are  not produced
domestically.  But Japanese growers produce  a wide variety of fruit that are preferred hosts
for the fruit flies that supposedly concern the California industry.  Some in the US industry
seem to be unaware that Mexico already meets the standards for exporting avocados directly
to Japan.  For example, one representative  from an avocado cooperative  said, "Scientifically,
I don't see any evidence that's remotely close to proof from the Mexican  side.  It's not the
same protocol we'd have to use to prove that our fruit was okay if we shipped it somewhere
like  Japan."  ("Crossing  the  Border:  Debate  over  Quarantine  May  be  in  Final  Stage,"
California  Grower, March  1995, pp. 37 - 41.)
95These mitigation measures are field surveys; trapping and field treatments;  field sanitation;
host resistance; post-harvest  safeguards; winter shipping only; packinghouse  inspection and
fruit cutting; port-of arrival inspection; and limited US distribution (Miller et al.  1995).
148Table 4.  Summary of APHIS  proposed  rule for importation of avocados  from Mexico
Risk Factor/  Proposed Conditions for Entry  Response  to Public Comments
Mitigation Procedures
Prevalence of pest  A municipality would have to be  SV export program  very successful  in
determined to be free of avocado seed  mitigating pest risk; past three years no
weevils and seed moth during the growing  pests of concern were detected  in five
season before exports would be allowed;  million kilograms of avocados shipped  to
orchards wishing to export would have to  Japan; fruit fly populations  would have to
be free of stem weevil.  be monitored throughout the year;
temperatures in November-February
significantly lower the level of fruit fly
activity.
Pest detection  (inspection and  Surveys that include portions of each  SV surveys for seed pests was appropriate
sampling activities)  orchard wishing to export and of areas with  for detecting  infestation; fruit fly trapping
"backyard" or wild fruit would have to be  conducted  by SV was flawed but export
conducted annually for seed weevils and  requirements would hold such trappings to
moth before the harvest; surveys for stem  a higher standard; packinghouse  sampling
weevil would have to be conducted  requirements alone would yield a five
annually on all orchards wishing to export  percent confidence  level of detecting an
and all contiguous orchards and properties;  infestation of one percent or greater.
trapping  programs would have to be
maintained throughout the year to detect
presence of three fruit flies; SV would be
required to trap for Medfly.
Host status of Hass avocado  APHIS agrees that SV surveys  in 1993
and tests under laboratory controlled
conditions were limited in  scope and did
not demonstrate that Hass avocados are
non-hosts to fruit flies; however,  APHIS
concludes that the surveys and other
studies demonstrate Hass avocados are a
non-preferred fruit fly host prior to
harvest; APHIS and ARS have never
found Anastrepha (A.  ludens) fruit flies in
Hass avocados outside laboratory tests;
more research is needed before  any
conclusion  about natural resistance can be
applied to the quarantine status of Hass
avocados.
Pre-harvest treatment  Regular field sanitation measures including  Growers  in Michoacan  use pesticides not
removal of dropped fruit and dead  branches  approved  for use in the US but the Food
would be required.  and Drug Administration  tests imported
fruits and vegetables for residues  and
denies entry if residue of an unapproved
pesticide  is found.
Harvest practices  Only fruit picked  directly from the tree  Fallen avocado fruit is more likely to be
could be exported.  infested by pests.
Post-harvest commodity  Currently, there is no effective treatment for  Would consider its use if a treatment were
treatment to eliminate pests  eliminating fruit flies or any of the avocado  developed.
pests of concern from Hass avocado fruit.
149Table 4  continued
Only orchards participating  in the SV export
program would  be eligible;  all shipments
would be labeled  so that any pest
infestations  could be traced back to orchard
of origin; upon discovery of any of the four
seed pests a municipality would  lose its
pest-free  certification and exports would be
suspended  until APHIS and  SV agreed that
effective eradication measures had been
taken; upon discovery of stem weevil an
orchard would lose its export certification
immediately for the  entire season; specific
procedures would have to be followed to
lower any detected fruit fly populations;
APHIS monitoring costs to be reimbursed
by the Mexican  industry.
Resources  to implement the proposed
safeguards  are already in  place; import
authorization would not be provided  if
APHIS resources  decrease  below the level
needed  to prevent the introduction of plant
pests.
Packing and shipping  Fruit must be moved to packinghouses  Hass avocados  may be a better host to fruit
requirements  within three hours of harvest or protected  flies  after harvest but requirements for
from fruit fly infestation during transit; fruit  post-harvest  treatment that are more
from nonparticipating orchards  can not be  extensive  than proposed by SV would
on packinghouse premises  during  prevent infestations.
processing of exports; screening and double
door entry system required;  sampling at rate
of 250 fruits per shipment; an SV
phytosanitary certificate would have  to
accompany each shipment.
Distribution restrictions  Restricting on ports of entry and  ARS would notify APHIS  if Mexican fruit
transportation  routes; APHIS inspection at  showed up at terminals in  prohibited
port of entry; restriction of final destinations  states.
to northeastern  states;  restriction of shipping
season to November-February.
Conclusion  Proposed requirements  go beyond those of  APHIS believes the system approach
the SV program and  suggested in the  would prevent introduction of plant pests
Mexican work plan;  safeguards make it  into the US, therefore it is unnecessary  to
unlikely that infested avocados would enter  establish Michoacan  as a pest-free zone
the US; even in such an event, restrictions  prior to importing Hass avocados; multiple
on season and destination virtually  safeguards would mitigate pest risk at a
eliminates risk of pests due to weather  level equivalent to that provided by a
conditions and geographic distance from  treatment yielding  a profit nine mortality.
susceptible growing  areas.
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Eligibility of orchards  and
packinghousespests."  APHIS concluded that the agency's proposed systems approach would provide an
adequate level of security to domestic growers, based on the results of its quantitative pest
risk assessment which concluded that with the proposed  systems approach  in place,  a seed
pest  or fruit fly outbreak might occur  on average less than once every  1,000,000 years  and
that a stem weevil outbreak might  occur on average once  every  11,402 years.96
Two aspects of the dispute about whether the Mexican work plan provides adequate pest
risk protection concern the value of the evidence that has been presented  about the prevalence
of pests in Michoacan and the host status of unharvested Hass avocados for A.  ludens.  The
CAC's technical advisors,  including scientists from the state's universities, were skeptical  of
the  proposed work  plan.on this basis.  In their  professional  opinions,  the risk mitigation
procedures  detailed in the work plan were predicated on surveys that were limited in scope
and flawed in execution. Many of the technical advisors concurred with one plant physiologist
who stated, "The research  conducted in 1993-1994  did not provide conclusive  data to base
a work plan on, rather,  it only provided the preliminary framework  on which to base a long
term research program" which would last, at a minimum, four to five years.97  Their technical
criticism of the pest surveys was detailed,  including,  for example, objections to incorrect trap
placement,  weak trapping bait, insufficient climatological records,  and inadequate  trapping
densities.98
In its proposed rule, APHIS acknowledged that it shared many of the domestic industry's
concerns  about  the SV  surveys  and  research being  limited  in scope  or  flawed  in various
technical dimensions.  As a consequence,  APHIS proposed more comprehensive  surveys for
host-specific pests during each growing season than had been proposed in the work plan.  In
particular,  APHIS proposed that these surveys would have to include areas  with  "backyard"
or wild  avocado  fruit  and  all orchards  and  properties  contiguous  with  orchards  seeking
approval to export.  APHIS also noted that it would require a higher standard for trapping
to detect fruit  fly population levels than SV had  carried  out in its research.  Trapping for
Medfly would also be required as a precaution,  even though Medfly had only been detected
in southern Mexico.
While  APHIS  concluded  that the various  proposed  requirements  for  shipments  from
Michoacan made it very unlikely that pest infestations would  occur in imported fruit,  in light
96This same report notes that if avocados were imported with no regulatory  controls except
for port-of-entry  inspections,  a seed  weevil  outbreak  might occur every  95  years,  a  stem
weevil outbreak might occur every 7 months, a seed moth outbreak might occur every 355
years, and a fruit fly outbreak might occur every 72 years ("Importation of Avocado Fruit
(Persea  americana)  from Mexico:  Supplement Pest Risk Assessment,"  USDA/APHIS, May
1995.)
97Statement  by  Marylou  Arpaia,  Cooperative  Extension  Horticulturalist,  University  of
California, Riverside,  11/30/94,  Docket No. 94-116-1.
9Statement by the  California Avocado  Commission  before  the USDA/APHIS,  Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Concerning the Importation of Fresh Hass Avocado Fruit
Grown in Michoacan, Mexico, Docket No. 94 -116-1,  1/3/95.
151of its reservations about the SV survey and research results, it also proposed  that permits for
exports be limited to the period November-February,  as had been requested  in Mexico's  June
1994 work plan.  APHIS  noted that during this season,  not only would weather conditions
in  Michoacan  reduce  pest  risks,  but weather  conditions  in  the  northeastern  US  would
preclude establishment of pests in the event that any  infestation were to occur.  With this final
provision,  APHIS concluded that it was unnecessary to establish Michoacan  as  a pest-free
zone  prior  to  allowing  Hass  avocado  imports.  APHIS  noted that  the  alternative  to  its
proposed rule was to make no change in the quarantine.  It rejected this alternative because
"there appears to be no pest risk reason to maintain the prohibition on avocados in light of
the safeguards that would be applied to their importation."
Discussion  and Conclusions
This paper has reviewed  the longstanding  and  not yet  fully resolved  dispute  between
Mexico and the US concerning phytosanitary regulations that prohibit importation of Mexican
avocados.  Since  1972, there have been three protracted  investigations of whether the fresh
fruit can be imported into the northeastern area of the US without risk of pest infestations to
groves in California and Florida.  The first two reevaluations  occurred  during the  1970s.  The
third reevaluation was given impetus by the commitment  of the NAFTA  negotiating parties
to  establish  scientific  principles  to insure  adequate  sanitary and  phytosanitary  safeguards
without undue restrictions on international trade.
During the  1970s,  domestic growers were successful in forestalling avocado imports  from
the Mexican states of Michoacan  and Sinaloa despite substantial  scientific evidence that this
would create  minimal risk.  Ten years passed before the NAFTA negotiations  prompted a
renewed period of inquiry.  Evidence has accumulated over the five years of this investigation
that suggests a systems approach to pest-risk mitigation can provide protection  against pests
in a least-trade-distorting  manner.  If so, such a systems approach would be consistent with
the regulations in the Fruit  and Vegetables  Quarantine of the US and  the stated intent  of
phytosanitary trade principles enunciated  in NAFTA.
Despite the domestic industry objections, on July 3, 1995  a proposed rule was published
by APHIS.  The proposed rule recommends  amending the existing  quarantine on Mexican
avocados  to  allow  permits  for imports  from the  Mexican  state of Michoacan  during the
months of  November to February,  when weather conditions  in Mexico and the northeastern
US minimize risk of  pest infestations.  The proposed rule also establishes  stringent criteria to
be met for monitoring insect populations,  harvesting,  packing  and  shipping practices,  and
inspections designed to eliminate any pest risks.
The proposed  rule  published by APHIS  marks  an important  step in the longstanding
dispute between  Mexico  and the  US  over the  pest  risks  associated  with importation  of
Mexican  avocados.  For the first time, the USDA is on the public record  in support of a
protocol  under which  imports  can  be  allowed  without  creating  a  phytosanitary  risk for
domestic  producers.  The proposed rule will be  subject to an extensive  set of five public
hearings  and to public  comment through  October  16,  1995.  If a  subsequent final rule is
152published  that modifies the existing  quarantine,  then the  avocado  dispute will  provide  an
important  example of a case in which international negotiations to liberalize trade facilitate
measures  to ease  trade restrictions in the  arcane  area  of technical  barriers  to agricultural
products.  The  final  rule could  be  subject to  legal  challenge,  but  even  so it  would be  an
important step toward the possibility that avocados from Mexico would enter the mainland
US legally for the first time since  1914.
While there remains some uncertainty about the final outcome,  a number of observations
can be made from the avocado case at this time.  The economic theory of regulation, or, as
it  is  better known,  political  economy  theory,  provides  a conceptual  framework  for these
observations.  This theory postulates that concentrated  domestic interest groups with high
stakes in a particular decision will often overcome organizational  and free-rider difficulties
more successfully than others and achieve regulatory decisions to their benefit (often income
transfers) at a net cost to society.  In the case of administered  international trade barriers  such
as sanitary  and phytosanitary regulations,  whether international  negotiations can affect  the
outcomes  of the regulatory process  in a constructive  manner  is  an important institutional
consideration.
In the context of political economy theory, the characteristics  of the avocado industry in
the US  are  consistent  with the  generic  description  of a special  interest  with  high  stakes
described in the formal  literature.  Large  start-up costs and long  periods  over which these
initial  sunk costs can be recovered through productivity  of the established groves give the
existing  industry  a  strong  incentive  to  maintain  any  barriers  that  provide  the  domestic
producers  with  a  favorable  price  differential.  The  industry  is  highly  concentrated  in
(primarily)  one region  of one state.  While  a modest number  of small  producers  give the
industry a degree of public presence,  there are also a number  of very large producers with
concentrated  stakes in the outcomes of any regulatory decisions.
Beyond  the  characteristics  of the  industry,  several  other  circumstances  related  to the
avocado  quarantine  are  also  consistent  with  features  identified  in  the  political-economy
literature as favoring capture of a regulatory process  by special interests.  Unlike some trade-
related issues of public health or environmental  degradation,  issues related primarily to risk
of pest infestation in domestic crops  are not likely to generate extensive  public interest  or
involvement.  The highly technical character of the scientific evidence that must be evaluated
also weighs in favor of an influence  on the regulatory process by domestic producers.  The
technical regulatory evaluation rests within an executive branch agency and the final decision
with the administrative  hierarchy of USDA.  The concentration  of USDA on the agricultural
sector  of the economy again  is a factor that generically  favors the access  and influence  of
domestic producers.
It is also relevant that a decision to allow importation of Mexican avocados into a number
of states simultaneously  is more of a discrete  decision than a decision along  a continuum.
While, allowing importation into Alaska may have little economic  impact on the domestic
industry (as well as pose insignificant pest risk), allowing imports into any plausibly-defined
region of the mainland is quite likely to have economically meaningful impacts.
153In the avocado case,  there is a longstanding well-documented  (indeed, beyond dispute)
history of political activity by the avocado growers to protect their perceived interests.  This
history has involved extensive interaction with APHIS  both at the technical level and through
higher-level  administrative  and political  channels.  Thus, the avocado industry has pursued
all three of the avenues of influence indicated in the schematic representation of the regulatory
process of Figure  1.  The extraordinary  efforts APHIS  and USDA have  made to facilitate
consultation with the industry and to make formal arrangements to receive its inputs attest
to the effectiveness  of the industry's efforts to participate in the regulatory process.99
A comparison  of market prices between domestic US markets and  an equivalent urban
Canadian  market  for  export-quality  Mexican  avocados  indicates  that  the  quarantine  on
importation of avocados from Mexico into the US has provided  a substantial  price advantage
for  domestic  growers.  The  price  differential  between  the  two  markets  has  induced
commercial  smuggling  of avocados  into  the US  because  of the  long  contiguous  border
between Mexico  and the US.  While these contraband  shipments have  not been of sufficient
quantity to eliminate the price differential,  numerous pests of quarantine  significance have
been detected in the confiscated  shipments.  Illegal shipments are not subject  to any of the
pest-risk mitigation practices that would be required under the proposed protocols for legal
importation.  Moreover,  these shipments  arrive in much  closer proximity to the  domestic
groves than would be the case for legal shipments to the northeastern  states.  Together, these
factors suggest that some reduction of actual pest-infestation risk due to lower incentives for
smuggling would offset any increased risk (however inconsequential  that may be judged to
be) associated with amendment of the quarantine.
Taking these considerations  together,  it is reasonable to conclude that a presumption that
the domestic industry had "captured"  the import quarantine regulations on Mexican avocados,
in the sense of the political economy theory,  is a plausible hypothesis.  Confirmation of this
presumption requires evaluation of the scientific evidence.  On this grounds, economists and
other  social  scientists  evaluating phytosanitary  regulations  are of necessity  dependent  on
complex  and often divergent  arguments by entomologists and other physical scientists.'
During the  1970s,  the pest  survey results  seemed to convince the technical  analysts in
APHIS  that  there  were  sufficiently  low  pest  populations  within  two  different  avocado
growing regions of Mexico that a protocol could be developed under which avocados could
99When it became  apparent that USDA intended to publish the proposed rule, the avocado
industry  made  an  unsuccessful  last-ditch  effort  to  have  language  inserted  into  an
appropriations bill for fiscal year  1996 requiring an independent peer review of APHIS'  risk
assessment and proposed risk management strategies before proceeding with the rulemaking
process.
'°A serious issue of research methodology arises here.  If capture of the regulatory process
has occurred,  social  scientists will not find formal  agency assessments providing technical
support for changes in regulations and will have to piece such a case together independently.
In the avocado  case, we are now fortunate to have the APHIS proposed rule,  otherwise it
would be much harder to make this type of evaluation.
154be imported into northeastern states while providing adequate protection from pest infestation
to domestic growers.  In Michoacan,  it was not possible to claim that the region was free of
pests of quarantine  significance  and the request to allow imports was formally denied,  partly
on the basis of cursory evidence of pest populations not indicated by the survey results.  In
the case of Sinaloa,  a senior APHIS  official requested  that a proposed change in entry status
be prepared but the request was not acted upon and importation was never allowed.  In both
of these cases,  conclusions drawn by the agency's technical  staff failed to be acted upon by
USDA's administrative  hierarchy.  Because pest-free status was not conclusively  established
to the satisfaction of all interested parties,  there was room for a regulatory  "judgement call"
over whether the proposed protocols  for exports to the US  provided  adequate protection
from pest risk when all factors were considered.  The domestic industry's opposition, which
was actively registered throughout the investigations, prevailed  on the final  decisions under
these circumstances.  This outcome is consistent with the capture hypothesis.
There  is widespread  acknowledgment  that  the initiation of discussions about NAFTA
provided the impetus to a renewed investigation of the avocado quarantine  after ten years of
hiatus.  The objective of the NAFTA negotiations was to minimize barriers to regional trade.
This objective,  which was endorsed by many segments of American  agriculture  and  at the
highest political levels,  implied that longstanding disputes about technical barriers  could be
expected to receive reconsideration.
Mexico moved quickly to put the avocado quarantine on the agenda for trade negotiations
under NAFTA.  A long investigation followed, with APHIS  and SV working closely through
the  Phytosanitary  Working  Group  to  determine  whether  changes  in  the  prohibition  are
justified.  The industry has opposed any reconsideration of the avocado import ban, but after
substantial  review,  critique,  and  modification  to  Mexico's  proposed  work  plan,  APHIS
published its proposed rule and has scheduled  public hearings  on the protocol recommended
for  allowing  imports of Mexican  avocados  from Michoacan  into  19  northeastern  states.
Again, this is a landmark event because the USDA administrative hierarchy has now approved
the agency going on the public record as supporting a protocol to allow imports that it asserts
does not pose risk of pest infestation to domestic  growers.
Given  the  history  of the  avocado  case,  it  may  provide  an  early  example  wherein
negotiation of an international  trade agreement  contributes  to rule changes that moderate
longstanding technical barriers to trade that are concluded to be too stringent in their effects
on international movements of agricultural products.  If APHIS's proposed rule stands up to
the  additional  scrutiny it  will receive  during  the extensive  period  of public  hearings  and
comments, then it seems plausible to conclude that, while there once had been capture of the
quarantine  regulation, the enactment of NAFTA served as a countervailing factor leading to
modification  of an  unwarranted  technical  trade  barrier--even  though the formal  dispute
settlement process that NAFTA established was never engaged.
If the quarantine  is modified,  the Mexican  avocado  industry will  come under  intense
scrutiny.  An amendment of the longstanding quarantine does not guarantee ongoing access
regardless of the results of future pest surveillance.  APHIS may repeal the access that has
been granted if future inspections detect pest infestations--as the reversal of the authorization
155of shipment  of avocados  from Hawaii to the mainland  in  1992  illustrates.  The  domestic
avocado  industry  will  have  every  incentive  to  ensure  very  stringent  testing  if Mexican
avocados  are  permitted  into  the  northeastern  US.  The  economic  incentive  for  Mexican
exporters to maintain  access to the US market will also be high.  Under this scenario,  to be
successful  the  Mexican  exporters  will  have  to  maintain  the  absence  of pest  infestations
promised by the proposed work plan for amending the avocado  quarantine.
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